
Rigging Elections – A Framework for Analysis and Prevention

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Conceptual Consensus on “Rigging”

- “Fraud” terminology
- Election fraud involves deception only and not all electoral crimes
- Applied understanding of fraud has differed over time and location
- Other terms – malpractice, misconduct, irregularities, and manipulation
Categories of Electoral Rigging

• **Acts of deception**
  • Illegal voting and ballot box stuffing
  • False claims or denials of claims of citizenship

• **Acts of coercion**
  • Vote buying
  • Voter intimidation

• **Acts of damage or destruction**
  • Theft or destruction of election materials

• **Failures or refusals to act**
  • Denials of service
Denials of Service

- Intentional or unintentional disruptions or delays that result in disenfranchisement
  - Voting machine malfunctions
  - Hours of services shortened without notice
  - Polling station locations difficult to access
  - Long lines at polling stations
Illicit Practices

- Practices which may not be illegal but fall short of international standards
  - Voter suppression
  - Inaccurate campaign literature
  - Forced withdrawal of opponent
  - Facilitation payments
  - Failures of due diligence by election officials
Characteristics of Rigging

- Magnitude and Impact on Outcomes
- Verifiable and Unverifiable Rigging – Impact of Observation
- Locations
- Electoral Cycle Phase
- Episodic or Systematic
- Resources – State and Illicit
- Relationship of Rigging and Violence
Where are the Risks of Rigging?

- History of Electoral Rigging

- Rating Levels of Risk
  - Likelihood of Occurrence
  - Impact on Electoral Outcomes

- Risk Stages
  - Voter Identification and Registration
  - Political Finance
  - Election Day Balloting
  - Transport of Sensitive Electoral Materials
  - Ballot Tabulation
  - Certification
Who Participates in Rigging?

- **Individual voter participates**
  - Vote buying
  - Migratory or floating voters
  - Voter “assistance” schemes

- **Individual voter does not participate**
  - Voter impersonation
  - Fictitious names on registry
  - Marking absentee ballots
Perpetrators

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Effectiveness of “Rigging”

• “Clean” and “dirty” elections survey
  • Electoral misconduct is effective for incumbents
  • Incumbents and dirty elections – 87 percent
  • Incumbents and clean elections – 57 percent
  • Average for incumbents – 68 percent (Collier)
Win-Loss Factors Involving Rigging

- **Rigging Tactics**
  - Increase likelihood to win from 62 to 84 percent

- **Years in Office**
  - Clean elections – 6.4 years
  - Dirty elections 15.8 years

- **Press Freedom**
  - No press freedom – 92 percent likelihood to win
  - Full press freedom – 63 percent likelihood to win
Rigging and Violence

Violence and Rigging

- Mindanao, Philippines (2009) – “flying voters” – attack at a voter registration site on imported applicants from another city

- Zambia – youth “enforcers” intimidating women shopkeepers
Index of Electoral Malpractice

- University of Essex
- Data obtained from election observation reports (1995 – 2006)
- New and semi-democracies – Latin America, Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union and Sub-Sahara Africa
- Coding 15 aspects of an electoral process
- 1 = no significant problems
- 5 = gross misconduct
Electoral Malpractice Coded Indicators

- Legal Framework
- EMB Independence
- Contestation
- Voter Registration
- Polling Arrangements
- Voting
- Counting, Tabulation, Results
- Dispute Adjudication
- Observer Access to the Electoral Process
- Media Coverage
- Misuse of Resources
- Vote Buying
- Voter Intimidation and/or Obstruction
- Candidates Intimidation and/or Obstruction
- Overall Quality of the Election
Malpractice Findings

- Media manipulation and the misuse of state resources are the sub-categories in which there is the greatest amount of overall malpractice.

- In electoral administration, voter registration and vote counting, tabulation and results are activities that are particularly susceptible to manipulation.

- Strongest overall predictors of electoral malpractice were found to be the per capita GDP and electoral system:
  - Poorer countries more vulnerable
  - Single-members FPTP of two round systems more vulnerable

- EMB organizations – multi-party EMBs and electoral integrity
Strategic Approach

• **Electoral Integrity Actions**
  - Prevention
    - Structural Factors
    - Technical factors
  - Detection
  - Enforcement

• **Electoral Integrity Agents**
  - Organization
  - Type
Prevention

• Structural Factors

• Increase the Likelihood of a “Clean” Election
  • Rising per capita income
  • Diverse “veto points”
  • Press freedom
  • Term limits

• Decrease the Likelihood of a “Clean” Election
  • Resource rents
  • Small populations
  • Low GDP
• **Technical Factors**
  - Legal framework
  - Procedural controls
  - Chain of custody requirements and other material controls
  - Training – technical and ethical
  - Political finance regulation
  - Long term observation
  - Mandatory audits
Detection

• **Electoral Rigging Theories**
  • Case-based evidence from witnesses and victims

• **Electoral Forensics**
  • Employing data (registration and voting figures) to identify statistical anomalies indicative of fraud

• **Election Technology**
  • Employing technology in voter identification and voting to deter voter impersonation and ballot fraud

• **Electoral Observation**
  • Parallel Vote Tabulation
Enforcement

- Electoral Integrity Agents
- Organization – Centralized and De-Centralized
- State
  - Regulatory
  - Security
  - Judicial – International and National
- Non-State
  - Political Parties
  - Civil Society Organizations
  - Media
  - Traditional Leaders
Thank you…

...QUESTIONS?