



European Commission  
United Nations Development Programme  
Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance

Summary report

# Thematic Workshop

**on Sustainability  
in Electoral  
Administration:**

Adequate Resourcing  
for Credible Elections

Maputo, Mozambique, 4-8 March 2013



## Sustainability

### **Acknowledgements**

The European Union (EU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would like to thank the 45 countries that sent delegations to the workshop. Special thanks are due to the Government of Mozambique and the country's electoral management authorities for their invaluable support in the organisation of this important event.

### **Lead Authors:**

Rafael López-Pintor, Gianpiero Catozzi, Raquel Rico-Bernabé

### **Comments and Feedback:**

Eamon O'Mordha, Niall McCann, Etienne Claeys, Ricardo Godinho Gomes, Susanne Hedberg, Simon Finley

### **Copy Editor:**

Jeff Hoover

### **Graphic design:**


Adelaida Contreras

### **Photos:**

Costanza Lucangeli, Raquel Rico-Bernabé, Gianpiero Catozzi, Niall McCann, Elwira Dolina

### **Disclaimer**

The contents of this report reflect discussions that took place during the workshop and should in no way be considered to represent a statement of fact or the official position of the organising institutions (the European Commission and UNDP), its member states or any other institution represented.



European Commission  
United Nations Development Programme  
Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance

Summary report

# Thematic Workshop

on  
**Sustainability  
in Electoral  
Administration:**

Adequate Resourcing  
for Credible Elections

Maputo, Mozambique, 4-8 March 2013

A graphic featuring a gear and a leaf, symbolizing sustainability. The gear is on the left and the leaf is on the right, both in shades of blue. A banner-like shape curves around the bottom of the gear.

*Sustainability*

# Table of Contents

**11 Introduction**

**17 Day 1: Sustainability of electoral administration architectures**

**19** Opening remarks and key notes

**21** Sustainability of electoral administration architectures

**21** Sustainability in EMB legal architecture

**22** Political sustainability of electoral administration

**26** Comparative analysis of costs of electoral processes in areas of crisis, in areas of democratic transition and in consolidated democracies

**28** Comparative costs of the three categories of EMBs (independent, governmental, mixed model)

**30** Sustainability in EMB financing

**32** A comparative discussion of different EMB models: the cases of Mexico, Nepal, Mozambique and Tunisia

**32** Mexico

**34** Nepal

**34** Mozambique

**35** Tunisia

**37 Day 2: Sustainability in electoral processes**

**40** Political sustainability of democratic processes and their EMBs

**42** Electoral systems, credibility and sustainability

**42** The role of public opinion

**44** The role of political parties in electoral and democratic processes

**46** Distance between the electorate and its representatives: Is the democratic system sustainable?

**47** Political and electoral campaign financing: implications on sustainability

**Day 3: Sustainability in electoral operations**

- 53 Sustainability in polling
- 55 Electoral procurement
- 56 Polling sequence: implications on sustainability
- 58 Securing elections: sustainability implications
- 59 Sustainability of out-of-country voting models

**Day 4: Sustainability in voter registration**

- 65 Voter registration: sustainability and cost implications of various methodologies
- 68 Voter registration and the introduction of information and communications technologies (ICTs): sustainability and cost implications
- 70 Voter registration methodologies and political sustainability throughout the process
- 72 Sustainability regarding data protection and the use of national identity cards
- 75 Independently managed voter registration versus voter registration generated from national population and civil registration systems: cost and sustainability implications

**Case studies**

80 Case studies discussed on day 2

80 Libya

80 Sao Tome and Principe

81 Republic of Korea

81 Côte d'Ivoire

82 Case studies discussed on day 3

82 Iraq

83 Senegal

84 South Africa

85 Angola

86 Case studies discussed on day 4

86 Egypt

87 Afghanistan

88 Cape Verde

89 Sierra Leone

**Concluding remarks and recommendations by the EMB delegations****Annex**

98 Agenda of the workshop



*Sustainability*

# Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>BVR</b>	Biometric Voter Registration
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EMB</b>	Electoral Management Body
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>JTF</b>	Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance
<b>NID</b>	National Identity Card
<b>OCV</b>	Out-Of-Country Voting
<b>PALOP</b>	Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (Países Africanos De Língua Oficial Portuguesa)
<b>Pro-PALOP/TL</b>	Project in Support of the 2009-2012 Electoral Cycles in the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries and Timor-Leste
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme





# Introduction

‘While the financial aspects are critical, the notion of sustainability is broader and it extends to political sustainability. The latter revolves around the question of whether national actors have sufficient confidence and trust in their electoral processes and in their political system as a whole.’

Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 9 August 2013 (A/68/301)

## Aim and topic of the workshop

The Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance (JTF) and the UNDP Project in Support of the 2009-2012 Electoral Cycles in the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries and Timor-Leste (Pro-PALOP-TL)<sup>1</sup> co-organised a five-day workshop in Maputo, Mozambique from 4-8 March 2013 to address issues surrounding the sustainability of electoral administration and processes. The discussions focused on two core issues: the costs and funding of electoral processes, and the extent to which costs have repercussions on the wider grounding of electoral administration in a state commitment to electoral integrity. Some of the specific topics addressed included:

the sustainability of different models of electoral management bodies (EMBs);

- the financing of EMBs;
- electoral operations costs;
- voter registration; and
- financing of political parties and electoral campaigns.

The overall goal of the workshop was to identify and share good practices that can lead to long-term sustainability of electoral processes. As such, it provided EMBs and other stakeholders with the opportunity to receive and consider comparative information, data, experience and possible models of electoral administration.

Well-run elections are a crucial indicator of the democratic health of a country. As of mid-2012, almost every country in the world organises national-level elections, and every one of these countries are challenged to continually put aside enough financial and human resources to ensure that each set of elections can take place in a universal and fair manner, where all eligible citizens are able, if they so choose, to cast a ballot to determine the make-up of their government.

What trends are visible in global electoral spending and what factors affect the cost of elections? Significant cost differences exist between routine elections in stable democracies, elections in transitional democracies, and elections that take place in post-conflict countries. In countries with longer multi-party democratic experience, elections are usually less costly than in countries where such elections constitute a relatively new undertaking.

---

<sup>1</sup> The acronym 'PALOP' refers to Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, a term used to describe the five Portuguese-speaking African countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. Pro PALOP-TL is a €6.1 million (US\$8.23 million) UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU). Its aim is to provide support throughout 2010-2013 electoral cycles across PALOP and Timor-Leste, a Portuguese-speaking country in Asia, by working with and in support of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and other relevant electoral actors such as parliaments and parliamentarians, civil society organisations (CSOs), media, and electoral justice institutions (mainly constitutional courts). The project promotes South-South exchanges and peer learning events as the main vehicle to promote sustainable capacity development of EMBs and other electoral actors. More information on the project is available at [www.propalop-tl.org](http://www.propalop-tl.org) and [www.facebook.com/propalop-tl](https://www.facebook.com/propalop-tl)



However, little research data is available on comparative trends on levels of investment in elections over time. This is a concern: just because a country is able to commit large amounts of resources to one election does not necessarily mean the country will be in a position to maintain those levels of investment over a series of elections. Thus a large investment in *one* election, due to the compilation of a new voter registry or adoption of new, expensive result management technologies, for example, may not be *sustainable*.

Sustainability in the electoral field can be defined as the extent to which a country is repeatedly able to implement elections with similar levels of commitment and resources, which lead to consistently high levels of public confidence in the integrity of the process. By this definition, therefore, sustainability does not relate only to matters of financial cost. Sustainability also relates to whether countries are able to commit the optimum levels of support from all democratic and judicial organs of the state over extended electoral cycles to maintain the integrity of their electoral processes. Additional sustainability-related issues are associated with whether countries become reliant on international assistance, or whether electoral choices that countries make will increase financial and political costs that can be hard to meet over extended periods. These concerns are important because being unable to maintain these costs may signal, in the eyes of some stakeholders (civil society, the electorate, the opposition), to a reduced commitment to credible elections.

## On this summary report

This report aims to summarise the presentations delivered and the discussions held among the approximately 200 participants from 45 countries who attended the workshop. It also includes an academic overview as background information necessary to set the discussions into a larger framework. Both the discussions and the related recommendations made by the participants may be of use for other EMBs as well as for electoral assistance practitioners.

A related eLearning course on the same matter will follow the publication of this summary report and will be available online by December 2013 for free at the dedicated JTF eLearning portal: [www.elearning.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org](http://www.elearning.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org)

## The Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance (JTF)

In 2006, the European Commission (EC) and UNDP strengthened and formalized a de facto partnership in the field of international electoral assistance that had been in place on the ground with the signature of the Operational Guidelines on the Implementation of Electoral Assistance Projects and Programmes<sup>2</sup>. The revised Operational Guidelines (2008) formalized the EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance, an informal, Brussels-based coordination mechanism that “has the aim of increasing the overall efficiency and adherence of the projects to the common EC-UNDP strategic approach. The JTF is coordinated by the UN/UNDP Brussels Office and is composed of the relevant EC and UNDP staff and advisors dealing with electoral assistance at HQ level. The focus of the JTF is on identification, formulation, implementation support and monitoring of all the EC-UNDP projects of electoral assistance. The lessons learnt are consolidated and codified so that they can effectively feed into the implementation of the new electoral assistance projects (and) into the joint EC-UNDP trainings on Effective Electoral Assistance”<sup>3</sup>

The JTF has organised several workshops and trainings of interest for EMBs and electoral practitioners and has published a number of publications that can be accessed on its dedicated webpage:

[www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org](http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org)

The JTF has also developed a series of eLearning courses that can be accessed for free at the dedicated eLearning portal:

[www.elearning.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org](http://www.elearning.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org)

<sup>2</sup> Available at: [www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=115&Itemid=129&lang=en](http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115&Itemid=129&lang=en).

<sup>3</sup> Operational Guidelines, Article 3.1.



- Report, November 2013
- Advanced democracies
  - Crisis areas
  - Transitional elections
  - Post-conflict elections



# Day 1

Sustainability  
of electoral  
administration  
architectures



## Opening remarks and key notes

In their opening remarks the speakers highlighted what was noted in the Introduction of this summary report: that the aim of the workshop was to elicit good practices that can assist countries in critically assessing methods of electoral administration that can lead to long-term sustainability of electoral processes.

It was also highlighted that the conference would tackle broader issues such as the role of money in politics, electoral campaign financing, and the strength of lobbies in shaping policies. In particular the conference would explore how these factors influence the credibility of democratic systems. Limiting party and campaign expenditure by law is a common method used to ensure a level playing field for electoral contests. Such laws are meant to limit disproportionate increases in the cost of political campaigns, balance the spending capacity among political parties, and restrict improper influence or corruption. Observations from around the world highlight how unrestricted spending may give an advantage to those with better access to money and can make elected officials answerable to certain elites rather than to the entire citizenry.

Conclusive evidence from well-established democracies shows that campaign expenditures have dramatically increased over the years in the absence of legally established thresholds on expenditures. The workshop addressed this and other related issues.



Regarding sustainability of EMBs, a number of challenges were highlighted, including the need for adequate budgetary support and staffing. In some countries, independent electoral commissions have been established to increase the credibility of electoral processes. Questions persist as to whether transferring the mandate of organising elections from a government ministry to an independent EMB has increased the costs of elections. Related to this, have the new electoral commissions succeeded at improving the quality of elections? Are elections more credible when run by independent EMBs than when run by government ministries or local governments? Are independent electoral commissions really independent? In short, are long-term investments into independent EMBs successful and sustainable?

## Sustainability of electoral administration architectures

### Sustainability in EMB legal architecture

EMB are said to follow a “governmental approach” when elections are run by regular civil servants from an agency of the executive branch of government, often the Ministry of Interior or Home Office; a “judicial approach” when judges are selected to administer elections; a “multi-party approach” when party representatives comprise the electoral body; or an “expert approach” when political parties designate by consensus a group of experienced individuals renowned for their independence<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Garber, Larry. (1994). “Election Commissions: Responsibilities and Composition”. Paper presented at the NDI-sponsored African Election Colloquium. Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. November ; and Harris, Peter. (1997). “An Electoral Administration: Who, What and Where”. Paper prepared at IDEA for the South Pacific Electoral Administrators’ conference in Fiji. October.

A more complex threefold classification has been formulated on the basis of structural characteristics that combine recruitment methods with functions performed: “permanent, independent national election commissions”; the “decentralized electoral system”; or the “government ministry”<sup>5</sup>. In the 2000 UNDP publication *Electoral management bodies as institutions of governance*<sup>6</sup>, the terminology ‘EMBs’ was first coined to encompass all types of electoral administration, and the following threefold classification was first established: governmental bodies, independent electoral commissions, and mixed models. This classification was adopted, among others, by the 2006 publication *Electoral management design: The International IDEA handbook*<sup>7</sup>.

A comprehensive legal framework is required for guaranteeing, in a genuinely democratic way, the exercise of the right of universal suffrage in elections. A legal framework can facilitate an electoral operation but can also add some challenges. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the level at which a country’s legislation deals with electoral matters, as well as to how many details are included in the legal architecture of the electoral framework. In this sense, legal (often constitutional) provisions provide for safeguards on a longer-term perspective, but also may constrain legal adaptability to a changing political environment. Lower-level legislation, on the other hand, may be prone to easier manipulation by stakeholders. To allow an EMB to focus on its core mandate, it is therefore equally crucial to strike a balance between what is included in the legal framework and what is left at the discretion of the EMB.

The type and mandate of an EMB may also have a direct relation on its sustainability. Governmental EMBs tend to be less costly but often raise questions as to their credibility, due to their ‘closeness’ to government. Meanwhile, independent EMBs might have higher costs but are generally created for reasons of enhancing credibility.

From a cost perspective, there are obvious pros and cons, often dependent on a country’s specific context, for a governmental/independent, political/non-political, temporary/permanent and centralized/decentralized EMB. Moreover, an EMB’s mandate may have a direct impact on costs and sustainability. The fewer the tasks of an EMB, the lower the costs involved; however, fewer tasks might also result in reduced credibility. Ideally, an EMB has to find the right balance between financial costs and political credibility in order to become a sustainable institution. The political sustainability of an EMB is enhanced if electoral results are accepted consistently over time (credibility), but questions about financial costs often remain (value for money). The legal architecture should allow for adaptation to political realities, meaning that

5 Klein, Keith. (1995). “Approaches to Conducting Elections: Why an Electoral Commission?” Paper prepared at IFES for presentation to the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South Africa. Cape Town.

6 Available at: [www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral\\_systemsandprocesses/electoral-management-bodies-as-institutions-of-governance/](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systemsandprocesses/electoral-management-bodies-as-institutions-of-governance/)

7 Available at: [www.idea.int/publications/emd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/)

financial costs should be reduced if credibility is not reduced.  
Political sustainability of electoral administration

Two of the main objectives of an EMB are achieving credibility, so that all stakeholders accept the electoral results (trust in the EMB), and ensuring that this credibility is sustained over time. The political sustainability of the electoral administration, which refers to its capacity to achieve and maintain the trust of stakeholders in the long run, is complemented by financial, operational, technical and institutional sustainability. For political sustainability, key factors are political will, the legal framework, the political party systems/structures, the electoral system and the EMB's internal procedures, all of which have an impact on the EMB's credibility. It is therefore crucial that an EMB, regardless of its type or model, is adapted to a country's specific context so that it can assure professionalism, transparency, impartiality and independence.

Any type of EMB should enjoy a certain level of autonomy, which would allow for it to resist undue pressure from any type of stakeholder. It should equally be able to attain credibility through professionalism and capacity to deliver. However, an EMB does not operate in a vacuum, which means it must have a flexible, dynamic approach that allows it to adapt to the context. The combination of a certain level of autonomy, ability to act and adaptation to context strengthens the EMB's credibility, a development that has a positive impact on transparency and acceptance of electoral results—which are the crucial factors underpinning an EMB's political sustainability.

Although elections are periodic events, the importance of credibility of elections over time cannot be ignored. Elections become politically sustainable when the credibility of electoral institutions and their good practices are enduring. One good election is not enough. There is a need to ensure that all components of the electoral system, including the electoral administration, are sustainable and that the credibility of the electoral process can be maintained in the long term. Electoral systems are sustainable if the needs of all electoral stakeholders are properly addressed, both at a given electoral event and consistently over time.

For elections to become credible in the long term, they must be professionally organised by an impartial body in a transparent manner. The EMB must ensure that:

- a. the elections are perceived as genuinely democratic, with broad respect for the integrity of results (its **political role**); and
- b. the electoral process is inclusive of all categories of citizens, and is properly

The EMB has two main roles and must ensure that:



The elections are perceived as genuinely democratic, with broad respect for the integrity of results

The electoral process is inclusive of all categories of citizens, and is properly managed

managed (its **administrative role**).

Regardless of which institutional model is chosen, the credibility of electoral authorities depends on whether they are perceived as an ‘honest broker’ of the electoral contest as well as an efficient provider of services—thus the complementarity of political credibility and professional performance. Non-professional, inefficient electoral administration is as damaging to the credibility of elections as the lack of independence and impartiality.



## Concluding remarks emerging from floor discussions

- Throughout the discussions following the presentations, the key words 'trust' and 'sustainability' were recurrently voiced. In order for an EMB to be politically sustainable, trust and credibility are essential. Political sustainability can only be achieved if there is confidence, among all different types of stakeholders, in: a) the ability of the EMB to act professionally; b) the ability of the EMB to act independently from undue pressures; c) the possibility to adapt to political realities and context; and d) the capacity to organise periodic elections of which results are accepted by all stakeholders. In addition, other elements (all of them of a political nature) are required for trust and sustainability, such as a viable, strong electoral system and legal framework.
- In order for sustainability to be achievable, negotiation and consultation on electoral frameworks are essential. The EMB's relationship with different stakeholders constitutes another crucial factor. Only if the EMB is perceived by all concerned actors as independent, impartial and autonomous can sustainability be achieved.
- Since the legal architecture of the EMB can either facilitate or complicate its own performance, it is important to consider which components are included in the legal framework and at which level (e.g., constitution, ordinary electoral legislation or both). It is also relevant to consider which issues are left to the discretion of the EMB for lower-level regulations in order to allow the EMB to respond to changing political realities.
- Different types of EMB come with different costs attached to them. Government-run EMBs tend to be, at least in principle, less costly than independent EMBs. However, the lower-cost element needs to be weighed against the credibility attached to such EMBs, given that independent EMBs often enjoy higher credibility than governmental-run structures. Similarly, permanent structures may be more cost-intensive, but perhaps would increase sustainability of the EMB. Over time, when the EMB's credibility has been established, the body should investigate possibilities of reducing costs.
- Legitimacy of an EMB is crucial for successful elections and results to be accepted by all stakeholders. Sustainability of an EMB cannot only be measured in financial terms, but should also cover operational, technical, institutional and political aspects. Together all of these aspects ensure an EMB's legitimacy. In short, the **legitimacy of an EMB underpins political sustainability**. Credible and sustainable EMBs are characterized by their ability to work free from undue pressure, in a professional manner and with a dynamic/flexible approach to adapt to (changing) local circumstances and conditions (i.e., not work in a vacuum).
- Sustainability of EMBs depends on: a) political will; b) the legal framework; c) the electoral system; and d) trust of all stakeholders in the factors and components described above. It is the successful ensemble of these factors that leads to an independent and transparent process.

## Comparative analysis of costs of electoral processes in areas of crisis, in areas of democratic transition and in consolidated democracies

One main lesson from available research on electoral costs is that calculating the total cost of an election is not just about getting a figure by dividing the total amount expended by the number of registered voters. The overall cost of elections depends on the environment the election takes place in—whether in stable, transitional or post-conflict settings. An electoral process, taking place in democratic transitions or post-conflict countries usually has higher costs than stable democracies. In the case of democratic transitions and post-conflict countries, both structural and situational factors contribute to increased electoral costs. Some of these factors include insecurity, lack of infrastructure, weakness of local expertise, larger expenses for training officials and voter education, and a greater reliance on overseas procurement.

The characteristics of consolidated democracies that make elections less costly often include some or all of the following: the greater presence of political will to manage efficiently public funds; the greater experience of the electoral administration; the reliability and permanence of the voter registry; and a higher degree of trust of the people in the electoral process and EMBs.

Some strategies and mechanisms that contribute to reduce electoral costs and strengthen the sustainability of the electoral process are: having a permanent, 'fearlessly independent' and professional administration; better planning; 'coupling' elections where possible (i.e., running more than one election at one time); and using feasibility-tested technology appropriate for the context. Once electoral administration becomes institutionalized and elections are held regularly, the result can be a 'mastering' of the practice.

Whatever the total amounts are, electoral costs can be looked at either in absolute or relative terms. Absolute costs can include the total figure a country spends on its electoral process, in an election year or over the course of a full electoral cycle (from the period just after the last elections to the conclusion of new elections). Absolute costs can also be broken down into the amounts spent on the direct costs of funding an EMB and the various electoral operations, and they may include the indirect costs of securing the elections (e.g., security forces) or the costs of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., court costs). Other indirect costs, which can exponentially increase the overall cost of elections, would include the costs of political parties and electoral campaigns and the amounts of money that electoral contestants spend from either public or private financing.

Relative electoral costs can be looked at in different ways. There are the relative costs of comparing one country's spending against another's—using one base currency, such as US dollars—to express the costs each country spends on its electoral process per registered voter, per 'turning out' voter, or even per citizen. In addition, there are the relative costs of a country's electoral process denoted as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in an election year or over a complete electoral cycle. Additional categories of relative costs include the costs of an electoral process in comparison to what that country spends on health care, education or state security and the military in a given year or electoral cycle.

From a cost-assessment methodological perspective, two key distinctions between cost categories are to be made. First, there is the distinction between direct and diffuse costs. Electoral-budget costs that can be readily identified on a budget document are called **direct costs**. There are also **diffuse costs**—those that may prove difficult or impossible to accurately assess even if properly identified. This category can be further divided by degrees of diffusiveness; for example, some costs for activities can be clearly identified, yet still cannot be disentangled from within the general budget of the agency involved (e.g., the contribution of civil registries in providing information to EMBs for the production of voter lists, or the production of voter lists by the national agency in charge of censuses and statistics). Obtaining specific information about such costs is frequently impossible because 'activity-focused cost audits' are not often practiced by organisations and agencies responsible for a large number of programmes and initiatives. Other diffuse costs may include actual costs hidden within the ordinary operations of agencies that lend various forms of support to the electoral process (i.e., police forces, postal services, school systems, local governments and public TV). While these are real costs, they are neither included in the electoral budget nor are they easy to assess in many cases.

An additional and important distinction is between **core costs** and **integrity costs**. This distinction may be essential for an adequate understanding of the funding of elections, most notably in emerging and post-conflict democracies where it can be difficult to establish conditions ensuring a safe, politically neutral environment and a level playing field. The costs routinely associated with carrying out elections are designated as **core costs**. They are incurred independently of the degree of uncertainty and security of the political environment and are associated with voter lists, voting materials, competence among polling officials, voter information, and organisational and logistical arrangements. Core costs are assumed to be fixed rather than variable.

On the other hand, the integrity of the voting operation is mainly a function of voter security and ballot security. Voter security includes ensuring the safety of individual voters and of voting and counting facilities; removing threats and intimidation

factors; and guaranteeing accessibility to polling stations. Security of the ballot implies arranging the voting and counting in such a way that the voter lists, ballot papers, tallies and other result records are tamper-proof. The main objectives are to preserve secrecy of the vote (disposition of the voting booth); avoid double voting (a safe ballot box, use of indelible ink); and eliminate undue manipulation of voting materials (printing control, storage and transport). The presence of party representatives and electoral observers—both domestic and international—may be required at the voting and counting locations.

In summary, **integrity costs** generally concern security arrangements for registration and polling places. They may include funding for international personnel serving as advisors to the electoral administration; tamper-resistant electoral materials necessitated by a low level of trust among contenders; long-term electoral observer missions; and intensive voter education campaigns and election publicity. Integrity costs tend to be variable since most of them are incurred when special and often unexpected expenses are required to ensure that the process works efficiently.

The relative proportion of overall election costs that can be attributed to integrity or core costs generally depends on the extent and level of conflict and security in a country.

### Comparative costs of the three categories of EMBs (independent, governmental, mixed model)

Even when multiple calculations are done and absolute or relative costs are compared, cost estimates alone do not, by themselves, assist in determining whether the resources a country puts towards its elections are actually effective, or whether more investment in elections would lead to better elections. The August 2011 report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly<sup>8</sup> notes that “well-run elections...are a crucial investment, but experience throughout the world has shown that it is not the case that the more complex or expensive a system, the more successful the elections will be.” Furthermore, significant investment in elections can come at the expense of expenditure on other basic services such as expenditure on healthcare, education, water and sanitation or welfare. Mindful of this, the 2011 Secretary-General's report “urges Member States and donors to consider carefully the cost of elections, and of electoral assistance, in the light of other development needs.”

Each of the major models of electoral management design has distinct and notable cost implications, and also implications on how much support an EMB might require from other state organs. Independent electoral commissions, for example, face a series

<sup>8</sup> ‘Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratisation’. Available at: [www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/resolutions](http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/resolutions)

of challenges in ensuring their sustainability, including the need to fight for adequate budgetary support and staffing. Rather than relying on the civil service, large numbers of temporary staff must usually be recruited and equipment purchased, often through a procurement process that must be conducted under extreme time pressures. With governmental models, meanwhile, sustainability-related challenges stem from the need for many government personnel to temporarily transfer their focus to electoral tasks only shortly before elections, and the difficulty in separating clearly their budgets and staffing profiles. Mixed models can face the challenges of both of the other models.

Alongside budgetary and staffing pressures, EMBs often require other forms of assistance from other state organs that cannot be *ad hoc* and must be institutionalised in order to promote long-term sustainability. One of the most complex issues relates to the extent to which the electoral administration relies on the established national population registration mechanisms to assist in compiling the registry of those entitled to vote, or whether the EMB can or must conduct the registration of voters in a completely independent manner. In the latter event, the EMB is often charged with the additional responsibility of trying to not only confirm the voting eligibility of the person, but also his or her identity under circumstances where the state national population registration systems are deficient or lacking.

There are numerous other issues that require close links with state organs, including electoral dispute resolution, out of country voting, the security of the electoral process, and the role of other oversight bodies (namely civil society).

In regards to electoral dispute resolution, for example, the electoral administration's sustainability may be more easily assured where legal mechanisms have been established to involve the state judicial organs in resolving disputes and enforcing the law. Effectiveness may be comparably limited when an EMB is isolated from the judiciary and must resolve all disputes by itself. However, transferring too much authority for resolving disputes to the court systems may result in a reduction of public confidence in the electoral process if disputes become engulfed in bureaucratic procedures and long court cases that require years to be resolved.

In general, it seems clear there that it would be useful to update the available studies and assessment on costs and continue to document electoral costs from a comparative perspective. One potential result of further research could be that the finding that election costs will continue to increase, as does the cost of many other public services. That potential finding notwithstanding, electoral administrators and policy makers should learn how to reduce some costs categories rather than expect that electoral costs as a whole can necessarily be reduced.

## Sustainability in EMB financing

As a rule, electoral budgets tend to be part of the consolidated budget of the nation on an annual cycle. In a non-election year, the budget for the electoral authority—whatever form it takes—is usually a line item of the national budget, or is included within the budget of the larger agency of which the electoral administration is part (e.g., the Ministry of Interior). In an election year, the corresponding budget is funded from the national budget by following ordinary or extraordinary procedures, depending on whether the elections were anticipated or called unexpectedly. Flexibility is particularly necessary in parliamentary systems in which governments may collapse unexpectedly (e.g., in response to losing a vote of confidence), or a prime minister may call an election at any time within a given term of office.

Almost invariably, electoral budgets are prepared by the electoral authority and processed through the finance ministries for approval in the legislature. Many finance ministries do not have the authority, at least formally, to curtail or amend an electoral budget prepared by electoral authorities. Some exchange and bargaining between a ministry and electoral officials may nonetheless ensue.

Electoral-related budgetary practice is better established in countries where the state administration has achieved a certain degree of organisational maturity and the legal system is stable. Often, the electoral budget for a fresh election after civil conflict, or elections in the midst of unstable times, is made on an *ad hoc* basis. When the country in question has requested international electoral assistance such budgets are frequently defined with the participation of international agencies.

Consequently, EMBs have different sources for funding. Usually their funding come from the state budget and is approved by the parliament. Other funds may come from the international community in the form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. This external support, while it *may* improve the quality of the election, can also have a negative impact on the EMB's sustainability, especially if the EMB becomes dependent on it.

There are different approaches aimed at reducing the costs of elections. The most effective one is probably through integrated strategic, organisational and management planning. In this sense, the electoral cycle approach helps to anticipate events and ensure better planning.

Improved governance and a growing level of credibility from the population towards the electoral process and the administration should also help reduce costs. That trend is clear when considering many stable democracies, where costs per voter have often dropped to under US\$5 per registered voter.

Another excellent way to reduce costs is through the budget exercise. As elections are organised in collaboration with other institutions, the budget should be jointly discussed with those institutions involved.

Finally, improved operational practices such as buying materials and services in a competitive manner help decrease the costs of the material necessary to hold elections. Recycling materials used in previous elections—which many EMBs tend not to do—is one of the best ways of self-financing. The benefits of recycling are many: it can reduce costs drastically, help the EMB to be ready for early or partial elections, and promote synergy among institutions.

## Concluding remarks emerging from floor discussions

- Questions and comments from the floor discussions mainly revolved around how to reduce costs and the new role of EMBs in making electoral administration more sustainable.
- Good governance, political stability and trust go together and are the basis for sustainable EMBs.
- Cost is important, but more important is the credibility in the process and in the electoral administration.
- Electoral administration is a part of the state administration and as such it should be considered as a professional civil service.
- If done efficiently, reducing costs should not affect professionalism. The more professional an EMB becomes and the earlier it undertakes planning activities (with strategies and vendors identified in advance), the more likely donors would support national procurement done directly by it. EMBs should be proactive and suggest better processes to their conditions and culture.
- Although it is difficult to get comprehensive data that helps estimate the cost of elections, it is important to continue producing this type of knowledge and finding less costly ways to conduct credible elections.

## A comparative discussion of different EMB models The cases of :



### Mexico

The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was established in 1990 following a series of constitutional reforms approved in 1989 and the passage of the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE), a law passed in August 1990 and currently in force.

IFE is a public, autonomous and independent agency in terms of its decisions and operation. It is authorized by the state with organising federal elections, including those for president and the two chambers that comprise the federal Congress. Its headquarters are in the Federal District, but it exerts its authority throughout the country by means of decentralized bodies located in the capital cities of the 32 states and in the 300 electoral districts in which the national territory is divided for electoral purposes. Unlike its predecessors in the area of federal elections, IFE is a permanent institution.

Since IFE's creation, the constitutional and legal regulations regarding elections have experienced further major reforms, all of which have had an impact on the composition and details of IFE. The most recent of these reforms, approved in 1996, reinforced the level of independence and autonomy of IFE by completely dissociating the executive branch from any aspect regarding its membership or functions. That reform reserved votes within all IFE's directive bodies to members who do not have links to any party or to any state power or body.

At both its central and decentralized levels, IFE relies on three different kinds of bodies: a) councils that serve as deliberation and decision-making bodies, in charge of ensuring compliance with constitutional and legal regulations in regards to electoral

processes; b) technical-executive bodies charged with carrying out all technical and administrative tasks required for the preparation, organisation and conduction of elections; and c) commissions that serve as surveillance bodies, which oversee voter registration.

IFE is authorized to carry out the actions related to the preparation, organisation, conduction and surveillance of federal elections. These responsibilities include the revision and adjustment of electoral districts, the establishment and updating of the voterroll, the creation and implementation of permanent civic education programmes, and ensuring the rights and prerogatives of parties and political groups.

IFE is also charged with the registration, funding and oversight of national political parties (as opposed to local political parties, which are registered by individual states' electoral institutions). Rules and guidelines for the registration of national political parties are outlined in the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures.

In addition, IFE can register national political associations, which are intended to increase and promote democracy in the country's political culture as well create a better-informed citizenry. The creation of a national political association is usually regarded as the first step towards the creation of a full-fledged political party.

As noted above, both the federation (national level) and the 32 states have their own electoral regulations, institutions and procedures; as such, there is a clear difference and delineation of electoral competencies between the two levels of government. Therefore, federal elections (for president, deputies and senators) and local elections (for governors, state legislators and municipal authorities) are separately organised and controlled. Each federal state has its own electoral calendar as well as its own administrative and legal organisms in electoral matters. Nevertheless, in some cases federal and local elections concur (e.g., the first Sunday in July of the corresponding year).

Moreover, administrative authority (preparation, organisation and conduction of elections) and jurisdictional authority (dispute resolution and application of electoral justice) are clearly differentiated and conferred to different bodies at each government level. At the federal level, IFE has administrative responsibility while jurisdictional responsibility rests with the Electoral Tribunal, a specialized body of the federal judicial branch. The Electoral Tribunal, as opposed to IFE, is empowered to adopt resolutions in certain cases and to give final rulings on local electoral challenges.

## Nepal

The Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) is an autonomous constitutional body mandated to organise and deliver credible local and national elections in Nepal. Since 1990 the commission has run four general elections (1991, 1994, 1999 and 2008) and two local elections (1992 and 1997).

ECN is empowered to conduct and supervise elections to the Constituent Assembly as well as local elections and referendums ECN prepared in 2009 its first-ever strategic plan covering a five-year period (2009-2013) and built both on previous experience and on recommendations of national and international stakeholders, as well as of election observers. The strategic plan is based on ECN's mission to conduct free and fair elections in an innovative, cost-effective and professionally competent way as mandated by the Constitution. The indicators set in the strategic plan to measure fulfilment of the ECN mission include:

- a. reform of the electoral system and election process;
- b. reform of electoral rolls;
- c. improvement in voter awareness;
- d. human resources development;
- e. reforms in management;
- f. information technology advancement;
- g. physical infrastructure development;
- h. more effective collaboration with stakeholders;
- i. research and development; and
- j. reform in monitoring and evaluation systems.

## Mozambique

The National Electoral Commission (CNE) is responsible for supervising voter registration, the conduct of elections and holding of referendums CNE is an independent body subordinate only to the Constitution (and therefore the Constitutional Council), while a number of other subordinate organs are answerable to it alone. However, complaints about CNE are submitted to the Constitutional Council.

The commission consists of 13 members, of whom one is the president. Members must be citizens of Mozambique and over the age of 25.

Five members are designated by parties/coalitions in the federal assembly according to proportional representation and eight members are chosen by those five members from nominees by civil society bodies.

According to law, CNE is subsidized through the state budget. The operational expenses of the commission are covered by an appropriation of funds from the state budget.

The various reforms of CNE occurred successively in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2013 and were marked by an increased pluralism in the composition of the EMB with a strong representation of the two major parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) and civil society. Although political representation in CNE is important, a key role is played by the commission's Technical Secretariat, the engagement of which has significantly enhanced the professionalism and credibility of the conduct of elections.

## Tunisia

Prior to the 2011 Tunisian revolution, national elections in Tunisia were held every five to six years, with voters electing both the president and members of both legislative branches. Following the revolution, elections were held for a Constituent Assembly that will decide on a new constitution for Tunisia, including the creation of a new independent electoral body. The agreement to create a new electoral body was part of a strong desire to break with the organisational structure and management of elections during the pre-revolution period.

The draft constitution provides for the creation of an independent electoral commission. Under a law approved in parliament in 2012, emphasis will be placed on criteria such as impartiality, the appointment of members and the financial independence of the EMB. This organisation will have a permanent professional administration and will be decentralized in all districts of Tunisia.

## Concluding remarks emerging from floor discussions on the four countries

- The EMBs are different in their architecture but all have the same goal: the organisation of independent, transparent and credible elections to strengthen democracy.
- EMBs share the same challenges in ensuring impartiality, improving efficiency and strengthening their human and financial autonomy capabilities.
- In order to improve the credibility of EMBs, special focus should be placed on the professionalization of staff, particularly in regard to planning, programming and intervention.




AN İKTİSADİ KARŞILAŞTIRMALIK ÇALIŞTAYI  
ELEKTRİK SEKTÖRÜNÜN SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR  
YARARLANIMINA VE YATIRIMCILARIN  
DİKKATİNE ÇEKİLMESİNE  
YÖNELİK BAKIŞLAR  
2014 Karşılaştırmalı Çalıştayı

2014 EC/UNEP Economic Workshop on  
Sustainability in Electrical Administration  
www.ecnep.org



# Day 2

Sustainability  
in electoral  
processes



On the workshop's second day, the different presentations and floor discussion sessions focused on sustainability issues of other elements in the political system that are related to the electoral process or could directly impinge on the conduct of elections. First, there is the role of public opinion as the 'forum of the public mind' and a crucial factor in the establishment and success of genuine democracy. This is closely related to the role of political parties as mechanisms of popular representation, through their articulation of interests and values among different sectors of society. A third element centres on the role and nature of the electoral system as the set of rules of the game, for the translation of ballots into seats and positions of power. The main components of this system include: the formula of representation (majority rule, proportional representation or mixed); the type and size of electoral constituencies; thresholds of representation and types of ballot, etc.

The funding of political parties and campaign financing occupied a good part of the discussions, as these are among the most challenging issues in both well-established and emerging democracies. Financing systems, legal frameworks of control, sanctioning powers as well as audit and reporting were at the forefront of topics noted by both presenters and the audience.

Complementary to the two sets of issues described above, a question was posed about the quality of the relationship between the electorate and its representatives. Well-grounded concern currently exists about the distance, often growing, between the electors and the elected, and on how this gap can be filled for ensuring the sustainability of a robust democracy.

## Electoral systems, credibility and sustainability


Choices made in regards to some basic elements of the electoral system may be crucial to achieving and maintaining its credibility and thus its long-term sustainability. Those elements include the electoral formula of representation, the criteria for eligibility, and the model of electoral administration amongst others.

The essential components of an electoral system are first defined in terms of the kind of representation institutions—parliamentary or presidential system of government, number and size of legislative chambers, local councils, etc.—as well as the formula of representation, which refers to how votes are translated into seats and positions of power in general (e.g., majority rule, proportional representation or a mix). Equally important are: the type of district (prefigured by administrative limits or decided by boundary delimitation committees); ballot structure (individual candidate, closed or open lists); and the district size—small (less than five seats), medium (from five to ten seats), or large (over ten seats).

As electoral systems respond to and influence the core issue of representation, they constitute a major factor in achieving, and maintaining over time, the credibility of electoral institutions and practices. The choice of an electoral system, which is among the most important decisions in a polity, should be viewed not so much as a technical decision but as an eminently political one.

The impact of the choice of electoral systems on the sustainability of the entire political system is enormous, as it affects political sustainability in general and also the institutional, operational and financial sustainability of the electoral process. The choice often determines how results are translated into seats and positions of power (who is elected) and how representation is achieved (closely linked to the electoral districting issues). The impact is different in different contexts and there is therefore a need to specify the objectives which the system is supposed to achieve. Ensuring 'fair' representation is a key principle when designing the most suitable (and sustainable) electoral system. Yet is not always easy or simple to define 'fair'.

When reference is made to long-term goal of the electoral system, it usually pertains to political sustainability: how to promote the development of strong, stable political institutions that are able to respond to changing realities. Nevertheless, short-term objectives of immediate political advantage also need to be taken into account. The agreement on objectives to be achieved by the system is crucial, but they can vary for different stakeholders and over time.



The choice of electoral systems is not made in a vacuum—thus the importance of the process of choosing an electoral system. In order for the system to be sustainable, the choice needs to be widely negotiated with all political stakeholders and should address all stakeholders' concerns. Sustainability is difficult if all such concerns are not addressed, or even if stakeholders do not perceive that they have been consulted with thoroughly.

The issue of inclusiveness is therefore vital to any system's sustainability, particularly the representation of different population groups (for example, women and minorities). The objective of ensuring substantial representation of various groups needs to be an explicit and integral part of the process.

The choice of an electoral system also has important administrative and operational repercussions, both in its core and secondary components, which can impact on the system's sustainability. Essential issues such as boundary delimitation, voter registration, whether there is out-of-country voting (OCV), electoral dispute resolution and polling and counting modalities are all influenced by the choice of electoral system. Each of these components helps develop the system's institutional, operational and financial sustainability.

## The role of public opinion

It is important to recognize that public opinion is not necessarily (and certainly not only) the results of opinion polls and media news, speeches by politicians, occasional public outbursts, popular revolt or what some people might casually talk about on a specific issue. Public opinion could also be seen as an institution of democracy, which grows and consolidates with time. It is about the ensemble of views that large numbers of people hold about an issue that is of public concern. It can influence decisions made by the rulers as well as the unfolding of the electoral process.

When discussing sustainability of electoral administration, public opinion is as relevant as issues associated with political parties and the electoral system since it constitutes a key foundation of democratic government. Wherever these three elements (public opinion, political parties and the electoral system) are stable and well connected, credible elections can help to consolidate the democratic system.

By its very nature, the democratic process spurs citizens to form opinions on a number of issues. Voters are called upon to choose candidates in elections, to consider constitutional amendments, to approve or reject municipal taxes and other legislative proposals, and so on. Almost any matter on which the executive or legislature has to decide may become a public issue if a significant number of people wish to make it so. The political attitudes of these persons are often stimulated or reinforced by outside agencies—advocacy organisations, crusading newspapers, interest groups or government agencies or officials, etc.

The role of public opinion varies depending on issues, just as public opinion asserts itself differently from one democracy to another. Perhaps the safest generalization that can be made is that public opinion does not influence the details of most government policies but it does set limits within which policy makers must operate. Public officials usually seek to satisfy a widespread demand—or at least to take it into account in their deliberations—and they usually try to avoid decisions that they believe will be widely unpopular. Politicians often act this way because those who ignore the possible consequences of public opinion risk setback or defeat in future elections. Yet some government leaders take into account ‘latent’ public opinion—i.e., the probable future reaction by the public to a current decision or action by a public official or government. As such, they may be willing to undertake an unpopular action that has a negative effect on public opinion in the near term, provided that the action is also likely to have a significant positive effect at a later and more relevant time.

Public opinion seems to be much more effective in influencing policy-making at the local level than at the state or national levels. One reason for this is that issues of concern to local governments—such as the condition of roads, schools, and hospitals—are usually less complex than those dealt with by governments at higher levels; another is that at the local level there are fewer institutional or bureaucratic barriers between policy makers and voters. Representative government itself, however, tends to limit the power of public opinion to influence specific government decisions, since ordinarily the only choice the public is given is that of approving or disapproving of a given official at election time.



## The role of political parties in electoral and democratic processes

Sustainable electoral processes are those that contribute to democracy in the long-term. Literature agrees that if elections are viewed as a nonviolent form of competition between different factions, political parties are institutions that make democracy possible. Not only do political parties articulate positions on, and stimulate debate about, issues of public concern but they also aggregate and represent local concerns and interests in the political system, which provides a structure for political participation. Parties also provide critical avenues for public participation and national dialogue in post-conflict and fragile states and can, therefore, be a peaceful arena for public debate, political competition and mediation of social conflicts. Political parties can hence be considered an important institution in democratic governance.



Political parties are often described as institutionalized mediators between civil society and those who decide and implement decisions. By this, they enable their members' and supporters' demands to be represented in parliament and in government. They adopt party platforms and set rules, telling voters where the party stands on issues. They should (ideally) promote public confidence in the democratic process. Moreover, together with civil society groups, the media, and domestic and international observers, political parties have a watchdog role to play in support of EMBs and electoral processes. All in all, we could say that in democratic contexts, political parties are **the vehicles that articulate the interests and values of the population towards governmental policies through electoral processes.**

Despite the importance of political parties, the relationship between parties and democracy, as well as the influence that parties may have over democracy (and vice versa), is a complex one. For example, can a country be truly democratic with only a small number of political parties? Does it make a difference to a country's level of democracy if there are multiple registered parties, but only one or two parties dominate the system?

Both among scholars and the public, support for a system with multiple parties is not unanimous. A politically fractured legislature can result in deadlock and fail to produce policy. In some countries political parties have often become hostages of strong and even autocratic personalities or have functioned as tools of vested interests. It thus not a guarantee that parties will represent the views of broad-based constituencies.

In fragile states, the barriers to successful political parties are similar to the challenges regarding elections. For political party cadres and candidates, the obstacles to safely travel or meet with supporters can cripple their ability to effectively take part in the political process. Even in non-election years, parties and marginalized or vulnerable populations subject to discrimination or intimidation find it difficult to organise, attract supporters and engage in policy debates.

Moreover, the nature and constellation of political parties can also be affected by other factors such as the electoral system. Electoral systems may also largely determine the number and relative size of party representation in legislatures. They can influence the degree of internal cohesion and party discipline and the incentives for alliances between parties. Additionally, electoral systems can affect the extent to which parties are likely to appeal beyond narrow interests or ethnic identities and even their capacity to represent and mediate social cleavages.

## Distance between the electorate and its representatives: Is the democratic system sustainable?

During the presentations and discussions in plenary some elements about the sustainability of democracy came up and interesting debate was generated. The following paragraphs intend to capture some of the elements discussed.

Historically speaking, democracy has existed in some form or another since 2,500 years ago, when some Greek city states adopted systems of electing Government by popular vote. However, it did not receive wide adoption until relatively recently when some European states, the United States and some Latin American nations adopted it in the last centuries. It was only in the 1980s and 1990s that the system of representative government, with varying degrees of quality, spread all over the world. In regards to sustainability, historical evidence shows that once established, democracy does not necessarily remain long-term, and may last for only certain periods of time.

What is frequently seen, and constitutes a threat to the sustainability of democracy, is that the distance between the electorate and its formal representatives is perceived by the former to get wider, and that the gap also widens between expectations by the populace and actual delivery by the rulers. This has always constituted a key challenge for the proper working of a democratic system of government. Hence a legitimate question can be posed: is there a limit to such distance where the democratic system is no longer sustainable? And if so, what are the signals of this potential critical deficit in democracy, and how can they be identified so that some precautionary measures can be taken in order to prevent the collapse of the system?

History and experience offer several examples of signals indicating that the sustainability of the democratic system could be moving toward a critical stage. Signals may include citizens' apathy, increasing polarization and radicalization of some sectors of the electorate, corruption, widening socio-economic inequality, and inappropriate public expense practices. All of this can erode the quality and solidity of democracies, both new and established.

The issue of sustainability of democracy is not simply a money question, but it has much to do with how common resources, certainly implying money, are used. Governments are successful and popular when they aim to build a better society, which includes the recognition and upholding of new rights and freedoms (both social and economic). As elements helping ensure sustainability of a democratic system, the establishment and maintenance of efficient, transparent, non-corrupt and accountable technical apparatuses of government, including the electoral administration, should be taken into account.

## Political and electoral campaign financing: implications on sustainability

There is no doubt that money is required to finance democracy. Without money in politics, competitive multi-party democracies could not function, nor could governments operate. Funds also allow contestants to reach the electorate with their messages.

However, money can affect equilibrium and fairness in politics. Some democracies are concerned that money may end up dominating politics, buying politicians or corrupting policy-making. In several cases, the threat posed by unrestrained money from commercial or criminal interests has long been acknowledged. The main problem with money in politics may not necessarily be how much is spent on campaigns. The more serious concerns are who pays for them, what is received in return (and by whom), and how this may affect public policy and public spending priorities.

In an era of explosive growth in political campaign expenditure across many older democracies, citizens can lose faith in the electoral process. Suspicion can arise that wealthier citizens and corporations have greater influence in public affairs and, particularly on the media, notably by buying time and space for political advertisements. Poorly regulated campaign finance can diminish political equality and corrupt representative institutions. When large political campaign contributions are tied to extensive lobbying of elected politicians, ordinary citizens may perceive a conflict of interest. Poorly regulated campaign finance thus can lead to lower participation in the democratic process, tainted electoral integrity and democracy perceived as impaired.

Groups whose activities are illegal, such as organised crime, may find campaign finance as a route to political influence. 'Investing in politics' could be seen as a natural step by, for instance, industry that requires weak law enforcement or that could benefit from having certain control over crucial public institutions, like customs, to thrive.

Limiting the negative impact of political finance on the integrity of elections is difficult and complex. Politicians who benefit from loosely regulated political finance may have little incentive to constrain it. Transparency regimes –those systems where all political campaign expenditures have to be accounted for- are hard to monitor and enforce, and even when successfully monitored they do not necessarily involve a limitation on campaign expenditure.

Moreover, the abuse of state resources between and during electoral campaigns is a problem in many countries. The majority of the world's countries have some basic regulations against incumbent candidates and parties using state resources for their

own benefit. Yet, many would argue that a wider concept of what constitutes an abuse needs to be applied together with stronger enforcement of relevant laws.

Legal limits on party funding and campaign expenditures have been used in some countries to avoid excessive or disproportionate increases in the cost of electoral campaigning. Such measures can also limit inequalities between political parties, and may deter improper influence or corruption. Expenditure limits could also be seen as a means to deter or ideally prevent candidates or parties from 'vote buying'.

However, in many countries legislation governing campaign finance is riddled with loopholes and in some cases poorly enforced. In some countries, direct campaign contributions and other forms of financial support are the dominant forms of political influence. From this point of view it could be argued that low-income voters have less and less capacity to influence political outcomes.

To address such fundamental challenges democracies should address the issue of political finance. How to respond, and which entry points to focus on, can be difficult to determine. For example, is there an ideal legal framework that can adequately regulate the ever-increasing costs of electoral campaigns? The last few decades have seen a significant increase in attempts to regulate money in politics worldwide, through disclosure requirements, various bans and limits, and the provision of public funding. Civil society groups are now also more active than ever in monitoring the financial activities of political parties, candidates and elected officials.

Many electoral systems require public disclosure of campaign financing so that voters know who is financially backing a candidate and whether this might influence future decisions once in office. Public disclosure of financing is usually done through periodic reporting by candidates, political parties, political action committees and lobbyists. Disclosure allows the government and the public to keep track of the amounts, sources and destinations of money in politics.





The timing of disclosure is also a critical element for transparency. If voters receive useful information after elections or too close to election day, this information might not be of much use to them. Therefore, regulators should consider the timing in the release of such information at least several weeks in advance of an election so that the public can make good use of it.

Moreover, systems with strong transparency requirements can be ineffective if there is no independent institution responsible for receiving, examining and auditing financial reports from political parties and candidates. Ideally those bodies should have the power not only to monitor candidates and parties' accounts and investigate potential political finance violations, but also to sanction where there is non-compliance with the law.

The global financial crisis and rising socio-economic inequalities are putting financial pressure on many democracies, including the older ones. Campaign funding is an enormous issue in post-conflict societies. Funding from undesirable sources has the ability lead to electoral violence and unequal opportunities for participation as it can reduce electoral competition, lead to one-party state domination or even a return to conflict.

In order to prevent negative consequences as those described above, better understanding of the key issues and effective legal and procedural frameworks are necessary<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, programming could bring a legal lens to develop a better understanding of the relationship between political finance and electoral integrity. This also could deter or limit political violence.

<sup>9</sup> The last decade has witnessed a better understanding of political finance through knowledge products. For example: *Study on political finance in post-conflict societies* (IFES, 2006); *Political finance regulation: The global experience (2007-2009)*; and reports of the Global Commission on Elections Democracy and Security (available at [www.global-commission.org](http://www.global-commission.org)).





# Day 3

Sustainability  
in electoral  
operations



## Sustainability in polling

To achieve sustainability of polling operations, attention should mainly be given towards cost drivers such as the electoral system, the political context, the level of infrastructure in the country, electoral planning and procurement, use of technology and the size of the country. The focus should be on cost-effectiveness from one election to the next.

The chosen electoral system has a significant impact on the cost of election day operations since the system determines, for example, the number of voting days (single/multiple), periods for special voting, the type of ballots, the requirements for voting venues, etc. Polling costs are also affected by the type of EMB. Those established in the independent model tend to have more obvious, direct costs, such as those associated with setting up sub-national offices. Governmental-model EMBs, meanwhile, rely more on governments' existing staff, systems and infrastructure, which means many costs are 'hidden' within the government's ordinary expenses.

Identifying polling stations has enormous consequences in terms of polling costs. Permanent or existing buildings, such as schools, can be used as voting venues. School buildings are distributed across the country and usually have the right size and layout to be suitable as voting venues. Temporary structures such as tents can also be used for such purposes. In terms of polling station costs, the costs of lighting needs to be assessed together with the quality of light as well as potential hazards and challenges associated with venues (e.g., in regards to generators, candles, batteries, solar lamps etc.).

Independent EMBs rely on temporary personnel who need extensive training to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge and authority to manage procedures at polling stations. Moreover, temporary staff are usually paid and require daily allowances that increase substantially the costs of polling day. The government model often relies on state administration personnel who are required to serve at polling stations as part of their duties, thereby reducing, at least partly, the cost of training and additional payments.

When looking at sustainability of polling costs, it is important to consider whether any of the materials (such as ballot boxes and polling booths) are reusable in order to be as cost-effective as possible. Even so, however, the materials need to be transported and deployed to polling stations across the country, which means that the level of a country's infrastructure development may also have an impact on the costs of polling. If elections take place in a post-conflict country that has very limited or barely no basic infrastructure, costs are more likely to increase related to the deployment of materials to all polling stations. In post-conflict settings, basic infrastructure is often poor or severely damaged, a situation that may require extra costs for additional logistic support such as the use of helicopters. Polling costs can be sustained or reduced if the electoral administration pays particular attention to planning, and avoids last-minute deliveries.

Another election cost to take into consideration is the use of technology, whether for voter registration, polling (e-voting) or results management. Feasibility studies need to be planned well in advance to ensure that the given technology is advisable within the given context, and whether such technology is appropriate for the needs of the country.

The political context is also a factor. This is important because lack of trust in the electoral system and process may lead to additional costs, such as the need to deploy extra security.

Assessing the costs of polling in a given country is a cumbersome exercise, and comparing them with other countries is not necessarily a relevant or useful exercise. Every country has its own needs, context and circumstances that need to be taken into account, and therefore polling costs vary across the world. However, by taking a close look at a number of cost drivers, it should be possible to make the costs of polling operations in any country both cost-effective and sustainable.

## Electoral procurement

Procurement in an electoral context takes place in a complex environment, with major procurement challenges linked to the need for large quantities, specific quality requirements, and high financial requirements. As for the cost of supply, three elements need to be considered (quality, time and currency) in order to achieve

a satisfactory result. The first consideration is not to compromise the quality or the results. Comprehensive analysis, knowledge of and compliance with key stages of the procurement process—planning, specifications, methods of acquisition, financing, bids, evaluation, contracting and management—can help hold down and reduce costs in the long run. Specifically it is recommended that:

- a. sufficient time is provided;
- b. the necessary expertise is at hand;
- c. adequate resources are available; and
- d. that transparent and accountable procedures are used to ensure value for money.

In regards to sufficient time, in all contexts last minute procurement drives up costs significantly. The transparency and competitiveness of procurement are undermined when there is less time available. In the worst case, when time is severely limited, sole-source or direct procurement may be necessary; although essential in such circumstances, that step rules out any competition and places EMBs at the mercy of a chosen vendor.


The issues of necessary expertise and adequate resources are also critical to prioritize. Sustainability is almost impossible to achieve where inappropriate procurement is implemented. Any material in cost—whether low, medium or high—that cannot be fully owned, operated, maintained and extended by the EMB in the mid-term is not appropriate.



Avoiding such traps requires an understanding that at the heart of procurement is the definition of requirements. The analogy of the restaurant is useful up to a point. If you order lamb, and the waiter brings beef, you have grounds for complaint. But if you cannot read the menu—if nothing on the menu is familiar to you—the risk of ordering something that you did not wish to eat is very high. As a result, many EMBs and development partners find themselves doing one of two things: ordering what other people have ordered in the hope that it will suffice or taking the advice of the vendor (the ‘waiter’) and ordering what they recommend. The consequence is a double failure. Costs will be higher and the material not necessarily suited for the needs of the EMB.

## Polling sequence: implications on sustainability

Polling sequence refers to whether elections take place as a single event on a given day, several elections are simultaneously held on the same day, or elections are staggered over a period of time. For example, in Kenya, Guatemala and other countries, all types of elections have recently been conducted on the same day—e.g., presidential, legislative, regional and local elections.



## Considerations:

- Single-day voting is associated with a lower costs compared with multi-day voting. For this reason, for example, the chairman of the *Independent National Electoral Commission* (INEC) in Nigeria has proposed doing away with staggered elections in favour of holding for all offices on a single day.
- Operational multi-day voting may raise costs (pre polling in US and Australia for example). This may have nothing to do with the specific electoral system. India has multi day voting primarily for security operations, not tied to the FPTP system.
- Systemic multi-day voting is normally related to a two-round electoral formula of representation, either for presidential or parliamentary elections, with the first-past-the-post (FPTP) or the block-vote system.
- In some limited cases alternative voting has been proposed as a way to minimize the number of days in systemic multi-day voting systems. However, little data are available to demonstrate that the reason for using alternative voting is related to costs and sustainability versus other goals.
- Multiple rounds of voting are generally associated with a rise in costs. However, voting over multiple days may take different forms, which may have specific cost implications.
- Staggered elections may provide certain efficiencies in situations where resources are not sufficient to run the electoral event on a single day. However, there may be greater security issues to consider if election materials need to be secured over a longer period of time. This may raise the opportunity for fraud.
- Regarding security, there might be extra demands on security forces when there is multi-day voting as well as considerations on how to secure materials and polling stations, human resources overnight or over multiple days, etc.
- Voting station premises: There is a need to more carefully consider the type of structure that houses materials if they will be kept overnight or even longer.
- Material/equipment management: Irrespective of multi-day voting, all materials should be available prior to the voting period, including extra equipment that may be needed.
- Capacity planning poses a greater challenge in multi-day voting situations. Societal norms should be taken into consideration in determining how to best allocate voters to polling stations over multiple days.
- Staffing requirements would clearly be greater over multiple days. Not only do more people need to be available, but other considerations such as more frequent breaks, etc. must be taken into account.
- On voter information, additional messages need to be developed and distributed. The costs of additional messaging should be noted early on when a budget for voter information is being developed.

## Securing elections: sustainability implications

Involvement of security forces in the electoral process is necessary and the role they play is important for the quality and credibility of the process. However, the risks associated with their involvement must also be recognized. Securing elections is vital to the electoral process since any failure in this regard may affect peace and stability, and endanger voters' fundamental rights to participation.

The need to ensure a secure environment requires carefully defining the role of security forces in the electoral process by determining the means and conditions of their involvement. This may include the protection of property—polling stations, EMB offices at headquarters and in the field—as well as electoral materials and EMB officials. Another roll may be the resolution of certain logistical problems. Security rapid-response mechanisms are valuable tools to provide specialized quick reaction forces if needed.

The involvement of security forces usually follows one of three models: EMB-led, security force-led, or mixed operations. Ideally, security forces should be under the guidance of the EMB and used at an early stage to conduct electoral security threat assessments, planning, and later implementation.

The planning process commences with the development of an electoral security concept, which introduces the key strategic and operational scenarios, from a security perspective, at each phase of the electoral cycle.



In the analysis of possible sources of insecurity during an electoral process, the perception of voters about the role of security forces is certainly one of the factors that needs to be given extensive attention. There are contexts, mainly post-conflict, where the extensive engagement of security forces may create suspicions among certain groups of voters who have historically or recently been in conflict with such forces. In such contexts, security forces playing even a minor role can be perceived as biased or in favour of one faction or party.

Appropriate and effective involvement of security forces in the electoral process demands that considerable resources are made available. These include material, equipment and adequate financial resources. Decisions as to 'appropriate' equipment should be made carefully. Security forces should be able to restore law and order where necessary, yet they should not be so heavily armed and intrusive that they disturb rather than reassure voters.

The EMB's ability to monitor the role of security forces during the electoral process is as important as providing security. Security forces are a potential source of intimidation and influence on stakeholders in the process and if their involvement is not properly monitored and controlled they can become a source of insecurity.

## Sustainability of out-of-country voting models

An out-of-country voting (OCV) model can be defined as the set of provisions and procedures which enable some or all electors of a country who are temporarily or permanently outside the country to exercise their voting rights from outside the territory.

There is no specific international electoral commitment, via such as instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which countries make that require them to facilitate OCV. Nevertheless, many countries make provision for OCV as a means to enhance universal and equal suffrage.

There are different models according to the specificities of countries and cases. There is not, however, much literature on this issue. Much focus on OCV has been in a number of high-profile post-conflict settings (such as Iraq) where political decisions were made to allow the voting of large refugee populations. Other countries that facilitate OCV do so for different groups and individuals who are considered likely to return to their country of origin. Where facilitated, OCV is generally in use for presidential and national-level legislative elections, but rarely for local contests.

OCV is a complex process. There are many political considerations, such as whether the population at home accepts the influence, on the choice of government, of some

voters—particularly second or third generation, etc. (Diaspora voters)—who do not live in the country. It is difficult to carry out a comparative analysis of the different models of OCV, as the variables are many and case specific. In general, the main models include embassy/consulate voting, external polls, postal voting, electronic (internet) voting and proxy voting. In some contexts, countries make two or more of these options available for OCV.

Embassy/consulate voting is the most common form of OCV. Voters go to embassies or consulates and cast their ballot. Sometimes they register that same day. This is normally a lower-cost model of OCV, and the risk of fraud is mitigated somewhat by the fact that there is often familiarity with the people, particularly in cases where countries either require or encourage their citizens to informally register their presence in the country with the embassy. Nevertheless, a disadvantage of embassy/consulate voting can be that the number of embassies and consulates is sometimes limited. In terms of trust, the polling staff may sometimes not be perceived as impartial if they are linked with the sitting government.

With regard to the external voting outside embassies and consulates, the most common example is polling stations in refugee camps, which usually takes place in post-conflict settings. It is also not uncommon to see voting organised in expatriate clubs or other places where overseas electors congregate. This option is rather expensive, as it increases the number of locations where votes are cast and thus can be costly in terms of security, etc. Such options also require the agreement of and cooperation by the host government. Postal voting, while not necessarily low cost, can significantly



increase the geographic coverage of the OCV exercise, but may suffer due to a lack of reliable postal service. There are also the other known risks of voting in an 'uncontrolled environment,' such as a lack of assurance on the part of the EMB that the vote is actually cast by the voter.

Another alternative is proxy voting, which consists of delegating the vote to a third person who deposits the ballot at a polling station in the voting country. This option requires a formal authorization by the voter to the proxy. Finally, internet voting is rarely used for now, but may become more prevalent in the coming years. It is likely that some countries may consider this a low-cost, sustainable option, due to the greater ability it may afford countries to reach eligible voters worldwide than in-person models. However, it can only be useful and sustainable once issues of system security are taken into account and mitigated, as well as other 'voting in an uncontrolled environment' concerns (e.g., impersonation, as with postal voting, etc.).

The apportionment and representation of external voters is important in order to determine whether they make for a single national constituency—i.e., a 'Diaspora constituency,' such as in Croatia—which is allocated a given number of seats, or their vote is sent to the constituency of their original place of residence in their country of origin. (The second method is obviously more difficult in countries where generational Diaspora are afforded the right to vote.) These are political decisions at the time of law-making or signing of peace agreements.

There are additional technical and/or practical considerations. Lack of adequate voter information might be an issue outside the country, as might be lack of access to the process by domestic observers. Depending on the size of the voting population, and the access that political parties have to them, campaigning may also become an issue—not only for security concerns in the host country, but also as it may be difficult to monitor from a campaign finance/media rules perspective, etc. From a logistical perspective, the size and characteristics of the voting population should be clarified, and its location and distribution properly documented.

In conclusion, different methods have different costs, with most of them are related to the size of the populations, the staff required, and whether embassies are involved. OCV is usually more expensive than in-country voting. A review process should be included so that the process, where committed to long-term, can be improved from both a cost and efficiency perspective.





# Day 4

Sustainability  
in voter  
registration



## Voter registration: sustainability and cost implications of various methodologies

An accurate voter registration process is usually central for political participation in a democratic context and it is fundamental to a successful election. It is the technical response to a fundamental principle rooted in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states under Article 21: “(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives... (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”<sup>10</sup>. In order to safeguard the electoral franchise, voter registration should ensure the universality, equality and secrecy of the vote. Partly for that reason, voter registration is usually a highly complex process and is generally the single most expensive activity within the framework of elections.

The main purpose of voter registration is to identify persons who are eligible to cast a ballot by application of the universal suffrage principle. In all countries where voting takes place, legislation and policies are needed to define, among other priorities, whether voter eligibility is based on: nationality and/or citizenship; the legal age to vote (usually 18 but may differ in a few countries); the residency requirements, if applicable (some country would allow out-of-country voting); and any other additional grounds for disqualification (e.g., prisoners in detention, persons with a criminal record, mentally disabled persons).

<sup>10</sup> The text of the declaration is available at: [www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/](http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/)

In addition to such identification purposes, voter registration might also be used to fulfil different objectives such as: a) the need to collect data for the establishment of equitable electoral district boundaries; b) to support election planning and logistics, as voter registration provides essential data to inform decisions regarding the allocation of voters to polling stations, the number of polling stations and polling staff, and the volume of election materials/equipment needed; c) to undertake public outreach and civic/voter education; d) to prevent fraudulent and/or multiple vote; e) to assess voter turnout and electoral participation; and f) to foster transparency of the electoral process and voter allocation.

Different voter registration systems and methodologies are used throughout the world, and within each category there are numerous variations. Notably, voter registration can be:

- continuous (permanent) vs. periodic (*ad hoc* basis for a specific election),
- voluntary vs. compulsory,
- state-initiated vs. personal-initiated,
- stand-alone vs. derived from the civil registration,
- active vs. passive registration, and
- manual paper-based vs. computerized (electronically captured and stored registration data) systems.

The choice of a voter registration system/methodology and technologies should be based on the particular circumstances in each country. As such, the choice should take into consideration the historical and political context, the applicable legal framework, the available time and financial resources, and the level of skills and other capabilities. Some quality standards apply to voter registries across the board, regardless of the selected methodology. A good voter registry should be complete, current, accurate, inclusive (with applicable exclusions as foreseen by the electoral law), and responsive to local conditions.

It is difficult to estimate the costs of voter registration, but based on comparative analysis three main categories of costs can be associated with it:

- **Core costs:** routine costs directly associated with implementing a voter registration process in a stable environment (training, transportation, fees for registration staff, equipment and materials, voter education during the registration period).
- **Diffuse costs:** costs at other agencies related to voter registration that cannot be separately identified from their budgets.
- **Integrity costs:** additional costs necessary to provide safety, integrity, political neutrality and accessibility to voter registration.

Significant cost differences exist among routine elections in stable democracies, elections in transitional democracies, and elections during special peacekeeping operations. Core costs tend to be high in stable and transitional democracies, while integrity costs are the highest in post-conflict situation and not relevant in most stable democracies.

Some standard parameters can be used to determine costs of voter registration processes and operations. These include

- a. size of country and population;
- b. political/social/ economic conditions;
- c. legal framework;
- d. types of voter registration (of note, for example, is that permanent systems tend to be more expensive);
- e. technologies of equipment/material;
- f. type of funding (government or international assistance);
- g. time-frames for planning and procurement;
- h. human resources (local and international expertise); and
- i. security.

Multiple aspects are fundamental to the sustainability of any electoral process and thus to voter registration. They include:

- a. institutional sustainability,
- b. financial and economic sustainability,
- c. human resource sustainability,
- d. technological sustainability,
- e. political sustainability, and
- f. environmental sustainability.



The main barrier to the exercise of the right to vote has historically been and continues to be non-inclusion of significant segments of the population in electoral registries (e.g., women, youth, disabled, and the illiterate).

In regards to key challenges, additional ones linked to voter registration are: a) national identity and establishment of citizenship or residence; b) porous national borders (especially in Africa); c) absence of reliable civil registry; d) manipulation of voter registration for undue political gain; e) de-registration of deceased persons; and f) difficulty in registering eligible young voters.

In conclusion, voter registries serve as a fundamental instrument for citizens' political expression. All-inclusive, clean voter registries should be considered as a safeguard to the integrity of suffrage, and therefore an essential condition for the legitimacy, transparency and credibility of democratic/electoral processes, as well as for the political stability of a country. At the same time, voter registration systems should aim for cost-effectiveness—using cost-effective means to register voters while abiding with democratic principles.

## Voter registration and the introduction of information and communications technologies (ICTs): sustainability and cost implications

The introduction of ICTs in voter registration in the last 15 years has greatly affected the costs of elections, management modalities and expectation among voters and political stakeholders.

On a positive note, the introduction of new ICTs seems to ensure tangible benefits, such as easier data check and deletion of multiple entries. If managed transparently, it tends to increase the trust of people and political parties in the system. However in many developing countries the sudden and urgent introduction of high-tech solutions has produced financially unsustainable systems. Moreover, global experience shows that, if implemented in a hurry, ICT solutions can lead to higher risks of double entries and inaccurate voter registration if insufficient time is allocated to cross-check data.

Of note, for example, is that the time needed to complete a review audit and clean the voter roll database once the field registration is completed can be greatly underestimated. Ideally, enough time should be allocated to allow second data capturing in case of error. In addition, EMBs often tend to neglect the high degree of fragility and technical needs of such high-tech solutions, which require highly competent technicians on the field, and the cost and time factors related to the replacement of the equipment.



INTRODUCTION OF  
HIGH- TECH SOLUTIONS



EASIER DATA CHECK  
AND DELETION OF  
MULTIPLE ENTRIES



IF MANAGED  
TRANSPARENTLY



INCREASE THE TRUST OF  
PEOPLE AND POLITICAL  
PARTIES



Countries have adopted different cost-saving solutions. Some have opted to co-share biometric equipment and costs among different state authorities (the EMB as well as state parties responsible for issuing national identity cards or managing the civil registry). However in the case of inter-institutional cooperation it is essential to ensure compatibility of databases and technical outcomes (e.g., identification pictures). Such a strategy has high risks due to the high degree of fragility and obsolescence of the equipment.

Recommendations regarding ICTs include:

- Advance strategic planning and sufficient timing are essential and should also allow for data audits and error fixing—e.g., between 12 to 18 months are recommended to introduce biometric voter registration (BVR).
- Highly fragile equipment requires permanent maintenance and skilled technicians.
- The introduction of ICTs has added values in terms of accuracy of data and transparency but its use is a major challenge.
- The most effective cost-saving solution is to build the voter registration on reliable national population databases.

## Voter registration methodologies and political sustainability throughout the process

Political sustainability in an electoral process has several aspects, and three are most relevant in the context of voter registration:

- **institutional sustainability** (an EMB's preparedness to use a given methodology);
- **socio-economical sustainability** (the extent to which a country can afford and sustain the introduction of a given methodology); and
- **political sustainability** (an EMB's capacity to create and sustain trust and confidence among key stakeholders).

One way to measure political sustainability is through the level of acceptance. If a process and its outcomes are accepted over time by the main stakeholders—including political parties, civil society and the wider public—it could be said that the process is politically sustainable. This aspect of political sustainability is particularly important for voter registration, which is probably the most complex, time-consuming and expensive of all electoral operations. It is also potentially among the most contentious.

Voter registration may work as a catalyst for raising public interest and stirring the national debate, given that it is regarded as one of the key elements for the credibility and integrity of the whole electoral process. To achieve that positive impact, both the process and the outcome of voter registration need to be accurate, sustainable and widely accepted.

Regarding the linkages between the voter registration methodologies and political sustainability of the process, it was noted during the workshop that quite often, the most sophisticated technologies available are perceived as a guarantee of accuracy of the voter registry. As such they are considered the answer to a range of problems. Regrettably, though, no registration methodology or technology by itself can guarantee political sustainability. A technology is just a methodology, a tool that by itself cannot guarantee accurate and complete outcomes.

Several factors contribute to a successful registration process, regardless of the methodology used. They include: credibility of the EMB and other institutions involved; technical skills, adequate time-frame, and proper strategic planning; inclusiveness and engagement of key stakeholders at every step of the process; transparency and the widespread dissemination of accurate information; and a comprehensive, broad and consultative feasibility study that examines the appropriate options for the given context. All are very important to political sustainability.

A certain methodology is often adopted because it is trusted by the key stakeholders, particularly political parties and civil society organisations. Experience shows that trust in a methodology, rather than in the process and its players, is likely to be deceiving—and that no matter the level of sophistication, political parties may question the way voter registration was carried out and its results. Lack of trust in the voter registry, possibly resulting in requests for its reform in the next electoral cycle, shows that political sustainability has not been achieved. While it is important to fully take into account perception and orientations of all stakeholders, it is crucial to conduct a thorough technical assessment for them to evaluate.

Inclusiveness, integrity and accuracy are fundamental. All eligible citizens should have the opportunity to be on the voter registry.. If correctly and timely used, biometric voter registration contributes to the accuracy of the voter registry by improving the likelihood of detecting and eliminating multiple registrations. Yet in general, a voter registration methodology can only partly contribute to addressing the principles of inclusiveness, integrity and accuracy of the registry. For example, in the case of a stand-alone voter registration not linked to a civil registry, no voter registration technology can enhance enfranchisement, prevent registration of underage persons or effectively deal with the deceased.

The case of Togo was referred to at the workshop. Togo introduced biometric registration in 2007 and updated it in 2010. In 2012, the political parties asked the EMB to start all over again (not just update the registry) because they had a negative perception. This experience underscores the critical nature of the principle of inclusiveness and dialogue with political parties in regards to voter registration sustainability.

Several stages of an electoral process should be considered to determine overall political sustainability: the delimitation of constituency boundaries; the definition of the electoral systems; establishment of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; decision over polling and counting modalities; as well as the transmission of results.

Inclusiveness and integrity of a voter list can only partially be achieved via voter registration. Even high-tech methodologies cannot always effectively address the issue of multiple registration. The use of high-tech voter registration systems or methodologies does not guarantee credibility of the process or protect it from possible political challenges to elections. For political sustainability to be achieved, trust needs to be placed in the process and the players, rather than in a methodology. Transparency, inclusiveness and communication must be ensured at every stage of the process.

Discussions among participants highlighted the opportunity to use voter roll database audits to strengthen political sustainability or acceptance—as was the case in Senegal where a post-election audit was carried out to assess the accuracy of the database. Also discussed was the importance of carefully assessing all associated risks and taking sufficient time for completion of procurement, operations and associated process. Six months were said to be needed to complete procurement of high-tech solutions, and 12 to 18 months to complete the whole voter registration process, depending on local context.

It was also noted that it is not always possible to have sufficient time. Sometimes an election has to be held without adequate time to update voter registration ahead of elections, which often means that some potentially eligible individuals are excluded from registration. Even in those cases, stability is the priority and consensus must be found between EMBs and electoral stakeholders.

## Sustainability regarding data protection and the use of national identity cards

A national identity card (NID) is comparable to a passport, but for national use. NIDs have two elements: the card in itself and, most importantly, the database containing all the information about each citizen. NIDs are just the top of the iceberg when it comes to registration of citizens and there are several underlying layers of information. In regards to elections, NIDs can be used for voter registration and help ensure eligibility.

They can be used for identification purposes on polling day, to register as candidate and of course to create a voter list. NIDs can also be used for the allocation of voters to polling stations.

There is an important policy vacuum in regards to NIDs. The technology is often moving faster than the policy environment even though governments are trying to come up with answers and solutions.

In the United Nations system there are many agencies specializing in different kinds of registration of various groups. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), for example, has a long experience in registering children (vaccinations, births, etc.). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registers refugees and has databases to try to build links with families. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) undertakes censuses and registration. Nevertheless, no agency is specialized in NIDs per se. There is therefore a lot of trial and error and much can be learned from sharing experiences with countries that have NIDs and have set up a civil registry.

It is important to distinguish between NIDs and a civil registry. NIDs are the keystone of a population registry that can contain information such as a personal number as well as ethnicity, criminal record or history of voting. Although this information is not shown on the card, it is in the database. A civil registry, however, tends to record key life events such as birth, marriage, divorce, change of names, etc. Civil registries have a different purpose (proof of birth, claim to identity) than NIDs.



In some countries, citizens have an obligation to identify themselves at any time (e.g., by carrying their NIDs), whereas in others there are no NIDs. In Europe, 25 out of 28 EU member states use NIDs (the exceptions being Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark). Some African countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Zambia have NIDs. NIDs can either be obligatory (and free) or voluntary (at a cost).

In 2006 the European Union adopted joint guidelines on NIDs specifying that they should be credit card size, paper or plastic and must be machine readable, either by OCRs (optical character recognition devices) or by microchips. Microchips are becoming more and more widespread as they can contain more data and data can be added, neither of which is possible with OCR. The problem with the microchip (as with the OCR) is that the holder of the NID cannot see what data are on the microchip.

Several key questions regarding NIDs were noted during the workshop. All were positioned as important issues to consider when evaluating their potential benefits and liabilities. Among them are the following:

- Who controls the database: a specialized state agency or the Ministry of Interior?
- Who has access to the data: only the agency in charge or other agencies as well? The more people who have access to the database, the higher the risk that the data on the cards are faulty (accidentally or deliberately).
- Is there only one database of citizens or a multiple-linked database by unique citizen number? Who has access to the link?
- How much data can be read/put on the chip, what are the most important data, and who can delete or amend data? Should the police have access to modifying the data?
- On privacy issues, is there a law that protects the use of data? Is there a data protection commissioner or ombudsman? Is there a freedom of information law that, for example, guarantees citizens the right to access and review the information about themselves?
- Should an NID contain information about criminal records?
- As more countries consider introducing NIDs, does this mean there is no longer a need for birth certificate? And are NIDs themselves really useful in the long-term? Machines are increasingly replacing humans (e.g., controls at airports). More biometric information could lead to less need for cards, maybe not even a need for NIDs.
- Who is to blame if information on an NID is not correct? Politically tainted NIDs could put an EMB's independence at risk. Public trust might be eroded, and it could be a burden on an EMB if it has to be in charge of citizen identification. If an EMB is going to have access to an NID database, clear responsibility on the part the EMB should be determined.

Such questions underscore other controversial issues regarding NIDs. For one thing, they are very expensive. Afghanistan has already spent over US\$100 million on an NID system, and the total cost is expected to be at least twice that, if not several times greater. NIDs can also be seen as an invasion of privacy, as has been the case in the United Kingdom. Security concerns stem from a risk of identity theft.

## Independently managed voter registration versus voter registration generated from national population and civil registration systems: cost and sustainability implications

Decisions regarding whether to create and sustain an independently managed voter registry, or base one on an existing population or civil registry, can be complicated. One important consideration is that demographers and election managers look at populations in different ways. While an EMB wishes for the highest possible participation, an 80 percent or 90 percent turnout may be considered a great success in a citizen-led, voluntary voter registration paradigm. A demographer, seeking to create a population registry, aspires to 'no omissions and no duplications' (i.e., 100 percent). Demographers, too, are not concerned with geographical subdivisions to the same extent as EMBs.

Nevertheless, both voter and civil registries face the same challenges of completeness and accuracy. Both are affected by the following developments, among others: people get older and are included (where they become citizens at age 18, for example, although some civil registries include newborn babies); people die and are removed (or not, as the case may be); people move from one place to another (including across national boundaries); people change their names and their eligibility may also alter.

Other challenges are related to costs and bias. The cost of maintaining a population registry, civil registry or voter registry means significant investments. Authorities may consciously or unconsciously suppress registration (in a voluntary paradigm) by groups they perceive as hostile. Similarly, authorities may favour locations or populations, thereby distorting the resulting registry.

From a demographer's perspective, a voter registration system is not an ideal starting point for a civil registry—the exclusion of anyone below voting age being just one of the negative factors in such individuals' view. Similarly, an EMB may not welcome the creation of a voter list based on data extracted from a civil registry if the supplied data cannot easily allow for the correct assignment of voters to polling stations. That ability is a fundamental requirement for voter lists.

Despite such concerns, many countries do create voter lists based on civil registries. Indeed, many participants and the recommendations of the workshop clearly suggest that the preferred approach is to have a reliable and continuously updated civil registry upon which citizen identification can be built and voter lists produced from personal identification documents. However, it must be noted that there are countries, such as Bangladesh, where the opposite approach has been taken—a comprehensive voter registry has evolved into a civil registry.

During the discussions it was mentioned that Côte d'Ivoire sought, in 2002, to create both a voter and civil registry at the same time. Cape Verde invested heavily (approximately €25, or US\$34, per citizen) to do the same, but policy makers see this as a once-only investment because the resulting system has e-government applications that go well beyond just voter registration. A lesson from that experience may be that it is simpler to achieve the level of integration (multiple applications, one system, one database) in a relatively small country than in a larger country. Such integration may be hindered due to the relative institutional power of agencies in larger countries and the political challenge of inter-agency cooperation.

The most recent and significant examples of the use of civil registry data as the basis for voter lists are those of Egypt and Tunisia. A critical input to the Egyptian recipe is the list of polling centres from the Elections Department of the Minister of Interior. Because identity cards contain citizens' addresses, it was possible to assign voters to polling centres without too much difficulty (see the diagram below).


A reference was also made during the discussions to the transparency and integrity mechanisms put in place by the Egyptian EMB (and its allied state agencies, including the Ministry of State for Administrative Development and the Egyptian Police Service). These include traditional channels where paper lists were displayed (police stations and courts, for example) as well as modern channels including:

- a dedicated website where voters can look up their registration details,
- SMS service,
- a call centre with 1,300 seats,
- a special smartphone application, and
- a 'gadget' application that could be embedded into other websites, thereby allowing third-party stakeholders to offer voters the opportunity to look up their details.


The total number of enquiries in Egypt through the modern channels was in excess of 42 million. Given the voting population of just over 50 million, this represents a significant achievement even allowing for the extraordinary circumstances of the Arab Spring and the events of January and February 2011.



Tunisia, too, had to create a voter registry in a very tight timeline based on civil registration data that featured unstructured address data and no native polling station or electoral area data. Using an approach like that of Egypt, with a similar emphasis on transparency and the use of the internet and modern technologies to maximise voter engagement with the process, the Tunisian EMB succeeded in inviting 84 percent of voters to present themselves to register or check their details. Meanwhile, a further 15 percent were registered 'automatically' by the migration of data from other sources, including the Information National Centre (CNI) and the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Justice.



# Case studies



- ▶ Libya
- ▶ Côte d'Ivoire
- ▶ Republic of Korea
- ▶ Sao Tome and Principe
- ▶ Iraq
- ▶ South Africa
- ▶ Angola
- ▶ Senegal
- ▶ Egypt
- ▶ Afghanistan
- ▶ Cape Verde
- ▶ Sierra Leone

## Libya

### *General context*

Libya is a post-conflict country. The fighting against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled Libya from 1969 until 2011, started in February 2011 and ended seven months later. During Gaddafi's rule, elections were not held and political parties were prohibited.

After the end of Gaddafi's regime, the new Libyan authorities opted for a mixed electoral system. It was decided that of the 200 total members of the General National Congress, 120 would be elected on an individual basis (single member districts) and 80 on a list system (proportional representation). The elections were originally scheduled for June 2012, but then were delayed slightly until 7 July 2012.

### *Challenges to the electoral process in Libya*

The High National Election Commission (HNEC) faced a big challenge related to the time-frame for elections. Newly created shortly after the transition from Gaddafi, it only had about six months to organise the elections.

As no voter registry existed, one had to be created in a very short time. The deficit of personal identification data pushed HNEC to use the 'family book' system to create the voter registry. Its task was further complicated due to the absence or weakness of governmental institutions. Furthermore, HNEC faced a security challenge due to continued instability across much of the country.

Nevertheless, HNEC managed to register 2.8 million persons out of 3.5 million potential electors. Despite all the difficulties, the electoral process was successful. This success was mainly due to the work of citizens who were very active and supportive of the process. Moreover, civil society organisations played an important role in encouraging people to participate in the elections and insuring the integrity and transparency of the process.

### *Lessons Learnt*

The sustainability of the electoral process depends on the adoption of adequate electoral legislation. In addition, the capacity of the electoral administration has to be reinforced in order to conduct elections in a professional manner, thereby enhancing the credibility of the entire process. The experience acquired during 2012 should help to improve the next elections.

## Sao Tome and Principe

### *Electoral administration and electoral processes*

The legalization of opposition political parties led to elections in 1991 that were nonviolent, free and transparent. Since the first multi-party general elections, the following electoral events have taken place regularly: legislative, presidential, local and regional elections.

The National Elections Commission (CEN) and its executive body, the Technical Electoral Office (GTE), have full legal responsibility for the organisation and implementation of all electoral operations, voter registration, training and civic education. The national structure is replicated at regional and district levels. Composition of CEN varied from 19 members in 2010 to 9 in 2011.

Relevant electoral legislation includes a voter registration law, an electoral law, a law of election commissions and a political parties' law; funding of political parties was established by law 8/90. Election funding has been supported by the government budget and the international community. From 2001 to 2011 the government budget financed 58 percent of the overall election fund and the international community supported the remaining 42 percent.

### *Conclusions*

- Voter registration: at the last voter registration operation in 2011, only 96,000 people registered countrywide. The sustainability of voter registration and the EMB does not constitute a huge problem considering the relatively small number of voters and the necessary elections fund to be disbursed. However, there is a need to improve others factors which can have a negative impact on the sustainability of the electoral process, including trust and confidence between the EMB and other stakeholders such as political parties and civil society organisations.
- Sustainability of the biometric system: Sao Tome and Principe being a small country, the financial sustainability of the system is assured as of today. System maintenance is still not critical.
- Funding of political parties: This is regulated by law and has been fully implemented. The EMB has attempted to become more transparent with regards to this issue.
- Role of civil society: Civil society organisations have been playing an important role in election activities and their relationship with the EMB has kept improving.

# Case studies discussed on day 2

## Republic of Korea

### *Country background*

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was established on 21 January 1963 as an independent constitutional agency and is composed of nine members. Three members are appointed by the president, three are elected by the National Assembly, and the other three are nominated by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The chairperson and the standing commissioner are elected from among the commissioners. The term of office is constitutionally guaranteed to be six years.

### *Conclusions*

- A fully independent electoral commission is an excellent way to ensure the independence of the electoral process and to increase the perception of elections as free and fair, notably in emerging democracies.
- The guarantee of independence and impartiality of EMBs does not simply mean structural independence from the government. A fully independent electoral commission needs to have clear regulations and procedures establishing its organisation and functioning, as well as appointment of members and staff recruitment procedures. It also must have an adequate and independently managed budget.
- Full involvement of civil society in elections is of paramount importance for the transparency and credibility of the process. EMBs should not only collaborate with but also initiate and stimulate the active engagement of civil society with the electoral process.

## Côte d'Ivoire

### *Context and developments*

Issues regarding political parties arose with the emergence of multi-party elections in the 1990s. (Prior to then, one party ruled singlehandedly.) The first electoral law was passed in 1999 but was never implemented, mainly due to the volatile political situation and the 2000 coup d'état.

A new electoral law was drafted in 2004 but only adopted in 2006. Among its features are that no spending limits are set for the election campaign and no criteria are defined for eligible and non-eligible costs. The law does specify that 1/1000th of the annual state budget should be reserved for the financing of political parties. The law provides for an annual funding of political parties on the basis of results obtained during the past legislative elections and for the financing of presidential candidates. Payments are made one month after the publication of the report of the Court of Auditors on the use of funds allocated in the previous year.

For candidates, the amount granted to finance their election campaign is set by an ad hoc committee. The Constitutional Court approves the amounts three months after the official announcement of the results. Under the law, sanctions of various kinds (suspension of funding, lawsuits) are provided for in case of non-compliance, by the beneficiaries, of the provisions of the text.

Altogether, over the period 2006-2010, about 14 billion CFA francs (US\$29 million) were granted to political parties. However, most of the subsidies due to political parties were not actually disbursed. This can be partly explained by recurring cash flow problems, which have led to a revision of the amounts, but also to some irregularities in payments and deadlines. It should also be noted that political parties have not complied with their obligation to publish annual financial reports. Data relating to funding of candidates for the presidential election of 2010 are not known.

### *Conclusions*

- Any law regarding the funding of political parties and candidates should be accompanied by an effective system of control and sanction. Institutions involved in control (e.g., the Court of Auditors), sanctions (the judiciary) and monitoring (civil society) should be closely involved in the implementation of the law.
- Transparency must be at the heart of the law drafting process, together with its application. At the time of legal drafting, clear norms must be set to define the expenditures that are eligible for public funding. At the time of application of the law, stakeholders should be involved in setting the amounts for disbursements. Finally, information and communication on the legislation is essential. Budgeting and allocation of funds must be fully mastered by all stakeholders.
- Parliamentarians must be strengthened for fully assuming their role in conducting periodic audits on effectiveness of internal and external funding of political parties, and must be able to make necessary adjustments to the law.

## Iraq

### *EMB type: Independent permanent*

The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) was established in 2004. During its eight years of work, it has implemented six electoral events. At the time of the workshop, it was preparing for the seventh set of elections, the governorate council elections due to be held on 20 April 2013.

### *IHEC structure*

The Board of Commissioners (BoC) is IHEC's legislative body. It consists of nine commissioners. The Electoral Administration (EA) is IHEC's administrative and executive body. It is headed by a chief electoral officer. Its task is to develop plans and procedures of the electoral processes and submit them to the BoC for approval.

### *Anti-rigging overview*

Election rigging, or fraud, is any 'illegal' intervention in the electoral process. It normally occurs during one or more of the following steps in the process: during voter registration; voters casting their ballots; vote counting and sorting; and initial lower-level tallying.

Electoral rigging or fraud is classified based on its mechanisms and timing. For example, pre-election rigging could be aimed at coercing or convincing voters to act a certain way by bribing them. Rigging could take place in an organised or collective manner during elections. Some examples include ballot stuffing, voter impersonation and 'carousel voting.' In an unorganised way and in individual cases, it has a lesser effect on the election results (for example, double voting, badly conducted aided voting and proxy voting). Post-election rigging includes falsely recording the number of votes cast for the various contestants on tally sheets, or the deliberate false data entry of results at tally centres.

### *Strategies used by IHEC to deal with electoral rigging*

In Iraq, some strategies used to combat rigging include the following:

- IHEC has carried out assessments after every electoral event. A continuous process of evaluation and lessons learnt is conducted. Similarly, a comprehensive review of all local and international observation reports is maintained, as well as classifying election complaints and taking appropriate actions.
- Deterrence efforts include developing and updating the procedures after every election in order to act against the forms of rigging and fraud experienced in previous elections.
- Detection efforts include taking necessary procedures when fraud/rigging is found to track back and detect the rigged polling stations/ballot boxes. Examinations are then conducted to identify the causes behind the rigging and the perpetrators.
- In response to rigging-related findings and priorities, IHEC regularly updates its procedures and strategies in an effort to further limit fraud.

### *Specific anti-rigging steps procedures undertaken by IHEC:*

#### *Before elections*

- Adaption of the electoral laws to include a separate chapter dealing with electoral crimes and the punishments against those who commit them. The types of sanctions applied could be in the form of depriving violators of pay (in the case of polling staff), not recruiting them in the future, or referring them to ad hoc courts if their acts constitute a crime, as well as cancelling the votes in the rigged box or polling station.
- Development of a special regulation to govern electoral campaigning. The regulation is aimed at curbing defamation of candidates and political parties.
- Development of updated procedures to fight impersonation.
- Continuous updating of the voter registry prior to each electoral event including deletion, addition, change and correction.
- Choosing the most professional polling staff, as well as reliable and well-vetted supervisors, to work in the polling centres and stations.

## Case studies discussed on day 3

### *During elections*

- Update and improvement of the voter registry so that the registry is produced at the level of the polling station rather than at the polling centre. This is undertaken to combat impersonation.
- The use of supervisors to supervise and monitor the training of polling staff. They are randomly deployed so that those supervisors from the south of the country supervise in the north and vice versa.
- Use of security features on the ballots to prevent photocopying and rigging of ballots.
- Use of high quality electoral materials, including indelible ink from reputable international suppliers, using ballot boxes and seals with unique serial numbers as well as using voting screens to boost the secrecy of voting.
- Using reconciliation/results forms to: a) ensure smooth tracking of the number of forms supplied to polling centres and polling stations; and b) finding out the number of used ballots in the boxes, as well as spoiled and discarded ones, and matching them against the original number.
- The existence of a continuous observation process from domestic and international observation missions.
- Availability of complaint forms and adoption of complaint filing mechanisms by voters and political parties' agents.
- Separating special voting from regular voting in order to enable security forces to provide security protection on the regular voting day.

### *After elections*

- Design of precise special software that can check and verify any failings in the data entry centre.
- Review of the reports of observer groups.
- Study and classification of the complaints received, with a systematic response to them.
- Using a fixed tolerance level regarding mistakes in the reconciliation and results forms.
- Recruiting professional staff at the data entry centre as well as ensuring a stable security atmosphere for the staff and ballot boxes until the date of announcing the results.

### *Recommendations from the discussions on the case study:*

- Integrity and transparency are the cornerstones of the success of any electoral process. Therefore, the soundness of anti-rigging procedures, their review and continuous update can help safeguard the success of any electoral event.
- It is necessary to hold lessons-learned sessions after every electoral event in order to analyze and assess the events of the previous electoral process and come out with future recommendations that can fight rigging and fraud.
- It is important to have international support and assistance to IHEC in an advisory role, through which the commission can improve its technical capacities.

## Senegal

Senegal has several institutions involved in the management of elections, including the Ministry of Interior and the Independent Electoral Commission. The Ministry of Interior is the lead administration and performs its electoral functions through its general directorate of elections (DGE).

The DGE is responsible for: drawing up and revising voter lists; organising and monitoring the distribution of voter cards; for monitoring processes and procedures of ballot printing; for civic and voter education; for the production and management of the location of polling stations; and for the preparation and execution of the budget for the revision of the voter registry.

The second electoral institution in Senegal is the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA), which is charged with responsibility for monitoring and supervising all electoral operations in the country. It was established in May 2005 and, by decree, consists of 12 members. CENA is represented at regional and departmental levels and draws its mandate from the Electoral Code. It enforces electoral legislation while ensuring transparency, equity and fairness in the conduct of the elections.

CENA is an independent body whose members are appointed for a six-year mandate, with one third renewable every three years. Its independence is ensured through various provisions including provision that its members cannot be dismissed or removed from office after appointment.

In addition to its electoral mandate during transition periods, CENA also oversees the country's electoral archives and ensures continued electoral education and awareness programmes. Moreover, it contributes to electoral reforms by proposing possible electoral amendments to both the executive and legislative branches.

## South Africa

### *Overview of funding of political parties*

In South Africa, political parties are funded from both public and private sources. Any political party may obtain funds from its members and other sources, including the private sector (local and foreign) and civil society organisations. Public funding is regulated and available to represented political parties that are required to publicly account for funds received. Private funding of political parties is not regulated, there are no constraints or limits to private funding, and there are no public disclosure requirements regarding it.

Public funding of parties accounts for a relatively small proportion of total funds raised by the larger parties in South Africa. Due to non-disclosure requirement of private funding, little is known about the full cost of political campaigning, but estimates are available.

South Africa allows for both public and private funding of political parties in the interests of financial sustainability of parties.

The country provides for regulated public funding of political parties and requires represented political parties that receive public funding to publicly account for funding received. However, South Africa is at odds with global good practice with respect to private funding of political parties in that there is no legal framework for the private funding of political parties.

### *Public funding laws*

The Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997 governs eligibility of political parties and allocations received from the Represented Political Parties' Fund. Under the terms of this law, a political party is entitled to an allocation of public funding for any financial year that the party is represented in the National Assembly or in a provincial legislature (but not to parties only represented in municipal councils).

Parliament allocates the funds to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which administers and allocates them to represented parties based on a formula that includes number of seats awarded to parties in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures jointly. Equitable allocations are made to provinces in proportion to number of members of respective provincial legislatures, and allocation to a province is divided equally amongst participating parties in the legislature of that province.

Under the law, public funding may be used for political campaigns and is also intended to enable parties to maintain a stable core administrative structure. Parties can also use such funds for activities such as inspiring and furthering political education and promoting the active participation of individual citizens in political life.

Separately, public funding is also allocated to members of parliament (MPs) to maintain constituency offices. Such offices are meant to serve equally all members of the public, not only supporters of the MP's party. Funds allocated for such purposes cannot be used for campaign purposes.

## Angola

### *Electoral background*

The first multi-party elections were organised with United Nations assistance in 1992. The next such elections took place in 2008 and 2012. Comparison between the two later elections shows a positive development in the management of electoral operations by intensive use of new information and communication technology.

The National Electoral Commission (known by its Portuguese acronym, CNE) is composed of a president and 16 national commissioners nominated by political parties with parliamentary representation and elected by the National Assembly. A similar structure exists at the provincial and municipal levels. In total, CNE includes 3,060 members with 1,332 administrative staff.

### *The general elections of 31 August 2012*

For CNE, the 2012 electoral operations turned out to be more complex than the previous ones in 2008. The prevailing political atmosphere demanded a high degree of responsibility from all stakeholders in order to ensure security, transparency and trust in the process. Some of the more complex areas of the process were the following:

- ensuring voting at specific polling stations within polling centres
- including electoral guidelines in the polling kits
- improving technological and operational procedures in the logistics of elections
- introducing geographically referenced mapping and a GIS (geographic information system)

Once the general elections were called by presidential decree, CNE opened various biddings regarding the production and purchase of a number of materials and services as required by the logistics of the elections. These included geographically referenced mapping of polling centres; production and procurement of polling materials; technological devices for the counting, transmission and announcement of results; and communication networks for data transmission through both voice and support drives.

CNE established an ad hoc Commission for Electoral Management for the last stages of the electoral process. Its main responsibility was to provide quick solutions to emerging unexpected problems during this stage of the electoral process. The commission's main responsibilities were the following:

- establishment of ad hoc commissions at the provincial and municipal levels
- keeping permanent contact with the organs of the state administration
- establishing a team working with the firms providing goods and services
- complete monitoring of the functioning of polling centres
- resolution of incidents occurring in polling centres

A huge logistics infrastructure was created for the organisation and equipment of polling centres and polling stations all around the country, which would cover all needs of distribution, maintenance and retrieval of information and materials. In regards to civic education, CNE produced a programme of communication, information and electoral marketing for raising awareness and the mobilization of voters to ensure their participation at the polls. Elements of this campaign included the creation of a Web portal with information relevant to voters and public information campaigns in TV, radio, written press and taxis.

CNE started announcing early preliminary results (50 percent of the vote) around 20 hours after the polls closed. Around 48 hours after all polling stations were closed, over 90 percent of the votes were counted and known.

Election monitoring was prioritized. CNE registered more than 70 electoral missions with near 2,000 observers deployed throughout Angola. They were all provided, by CNE, with electoral observation kits including electoral legislation in different languages. A number of seminars as well as visits to CNE facilities were offered both before the elections and during polling day.

## Egypt

Discussions at the workshop regarding Egypt focused on voter registration.

### *General context*

- Egypt is a country in transition following the 2011 revolution. Parliamentary and presidential elections and two referenda took place in 2011 and 2012.
- In Egypt, voter registries established before 2011 lacked credibility. The Ministry of Interior was in charge of registering voters for the post-revolution electoral events.

### *Voter registration model*

The current voter registry is extracted from the national identity database that was created in 1990. For the 2011 and 2012 elections, the Egyptian authorities decided to avoid the old voluntary voter registration model. The aim was to put an end to practices by the old regime where voter registries were alleged to have been manipulated. The recently used model was supposed to improve the quality of the voter registry, in terms of inclusiveness and accuracy.

However, the new model did not work as well as hoped due to some difficulties related to the fact that the national identity database was not conceived for electoral use and it needed some adaptations. For example, addresses of electors were not precise enough to allow the High Election Commission (HIC), the name of the EMB in 2011 and 2012, to allocate them to polling centres.

### *The EMB's challenges and activities*

The EMB was under major pressure because of the limited time-frame to organise the elections and the large number of electors (more than 50 million). Also, HIC faced the challenge of gaining the confidence of electors because of the discredited heritage of elections held by the previous regime and the divisions among politicians and political parties.

Prior to the 2011 and 2012 polls, the EMB carried out different operations aiming to update the voter registry, inform people through a media campaign, and allocate electors to polling centres. Big efforts were made to register electors abroad.

### *Future perspectives*

The 2012 new Egyptian Constitution specifies that the government has the duty to register all electors. As such, voter registration has a constitutional basis and the EMB is expected to give the issue considerable attention and resources.

At the time of the workshop, the draft of the future electoral law adopted the same option with regards to voter registration. In the future, the voter registry is to be extracted from the national identity database, since that model worked reasonably well during the elections of 2011 and 2012.

# Case studies discussed on day 4

## Afghanistan

The case study presented by the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) aimed at demonstrating the challenges experienced in voter registration when a country is in transition to democracy and has low human development indexes.

Afghanistan also has significant challenges related to voter registration. There are no systematic civil registries, and the government has no documents or registries relating to the electorate's personal data, such as birth and death dates, marriage registration, and consistency of names. There is a lack of formal district boundaries and address information. There is no census data, and accurate data collection is non-existent.

### *Independent Elections Commission (IEC)*

IEC was established by the Constitution and the electoral law to implement presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections. It is an independent and autonomous body that is mandated by law to perform all the national and provincial elections in Afghanistan as well as lower-level ones including mayoral and district council elections. It is mandated by law to ensure that all elections are free, fair and credible.

IEC has a seven-member commission and a Secretariat based at headquarters and affiliate offices in all 34 provinces. The commissioners and a chief electoral officer are appointed directly by the country's president. Two presidential elections and two provincial elections have been held to date, in 2004-2005 and 2009-2010. Afghanistan is presently preparing for the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections and parliamentary elections the following year.

### *Voter registration background*

Voter registration has been a challenging process. A range of factors—including security threats, low literacy and poor organisation rates—has made efforts over the years time-consuming, expensive and often only partially successful. The electoral law states that if the voter registry is drawn from a civil registry, for example, IEC has the responsibility to ensure that eligible voters register with it. But civil registry data is largely absent and no other clear and direct options for identifying voters exist, therefore compromising the integrity of voter registration.

In 2003-2004, a national voter registry was established and subsequently updated in 2005. Shortly thereafter, in 2006-2007, a joint civil and voter registry was piloted. However, the programme was not successful because coordination with the Ministry of Interior proved to be extremely difficult. Among other challenges, timelines for voter registration and national identity card programmes were not compatible in the short to medium term.

In 2008 the voter registry was updated once more and the use of biometric data was explored. Voters' fingerprints were taken and scanned into the system. This was challenging due to data incompatibility (e.g. the date of scanning could not be validated). In 2010 there was another voter registration exercise; as with the previous ones, it was problematic for reasons including the lack of boundary delimitation, which resulted in non-designated polling centres without specific voter lists produced.

Overall, the IEC has not received favourable observer reports, both international and national, with regard to its voter registration efforts. All reports conclude that the process is often flawed, which damages its credibility. Establishing a civil registry based on the recently launched tazkira project, which aims to provide citizens with electronic national identity cards, is one possible option for a long-term voter registration.

### *Preparation for 2014 elections*

IEC has made a series of decisions affecting the 2014 elections. Following the 2012 EC-UNDP Thematic Workshop on Information technology and Elections Management, a feasibility study was carried out on the voter lists. The recommendations for the feasibility study informed the voter registration process, which has been initiated early. The president issued a decree in 2012 for a nationwide voter registration plan and a budget. An initial plan was produced in October 2012, with follow-up plans released in December 2012 and January 2013. At the time of the workshop, IEC was discussing the issuing of identity cards with the Ministry of Interior.

### *Lessons learnt*

- Given that elections are political processes, there is a need to negotiate with key stakeholders with a view to achieving consensus on strategic objectives and support on voter registration operations.
- A strategic approach to a choice of voter registry system must harmonize short- and long-term (political and operational) objectives.
- There must be sufficient emphasis on, and time for, the operational planning of a voter registration exercise. A plan must include provisions for shifting from periodic to continuous operations (possibly to a civil registry) and provisions for deregistration.
- To ensure sustainability in Afghanistan specifically, it is critical: to have political will and ensure that the EMB is independent and that the legal framework is adhered to; that technical consideration is given to polling lists; and that costs should be factored in for the future electronic national identity card enrolment, the purchase and maintenance of technology, and updating data.

## Cape Verde

In general, the electoral system has enough credibility to be accepted by all stakeholders. Diaspora and out-of-country voting are allowed and important, given the proportionally large number of eligible voters living abroad. The civil registry works fairly well.

### *Current system of voter registration*

The electoral process is under the responsibility of the five-member Independent National Electoral Commission. Its members are selected by Parliament with a mandate for the supervision of elections. Direct electoral management is the responsibility of the General Directorate of Support to Electoral Processes within the Ministry of Interior. Voter registration is mandatory and is conducted on a continuous, permanent basis. Voter registration commissions are responsible for the registration of national voters, foreigners entitled to vote, as well as citizens living in the Diaspora.

Since 2007, voter registration commissions have been required to keep a copy of the civil registry database. This database also allows access to the list of deceased individuals as well as of those who have acquired Cape Verdean nationality. To register, citizens must produce a digitized signature. Biometric information is not used at the polling station—as only an identity card is necessary—but voter registration commissions also maintain a support file with voter photos.

Voter lists are produced from the lists available 30 days ahead of elections. Citizens have online accessibility to voter lists. They also are notified about their registration and may consult the voter lists displayed at registration centres. By either mechanism citizens can correct registration details if necessary.

If, at the time of registering, citizens have provided a cellular phone number, they receive information via SMS on the eve of elections about the polling station where they are supposed to vote. A phone 'green' number was also created for those citizens who might need information about their voting place.

The overall cost of voter registration is €500,000 (US\$675,000) per year. After some problems arose, mainly related to voters from the diaspora, authorities tried to find means for improving and rationalizing the process. Hence the National System of Identification and Authentication of Citizens (known by its Portuguese acronym, SNIAC) was created.

### *SNIAC*

Similar to the identity card system used in Portugal, SNIAC envisages the merging of different databases used for the provision of all public services, including the issuance of passports.

SNIAC was being discussed in Parliament at the time of the Maputo workshop. An initial proposal was made in 2006 and discussed by working groups, whose final version went to Parliament. The system aims to create an information platform by interconnecting the biometric electoral registry and an optimized civil registry including in regards to recording and counting births, deaths, foreign residents and nationals. The estimated cost was €4.5 million (US\$6.1 million), to be funded by the government budget (€2.3 million), Pro-PALOP-TL (€1.6 million), and Portugal (€0.5 million).

Although a range of databases will be merged under the plan, electoral authorities will only have access to data from those citizens considered eligible to vote.

The following are among the main challenges to this system:

- the creation and maintenance of a reliable database related to the place of residence given the fact that there is substantial geographical mobility in Cape Verdean society, both inside and outside the country;
- maintenance of a service with similar quality for both the citizens residing in country and those in the diaspora; and
- consensus building for the dismantling of the voter registration commissions once the new system becomes operational.

In technical terms, the existing voter database is reliable as it was tested in the 2011 elections. Establishing a legal base is the only requirement to make possible the linking of the different databases, and also to produce an automatic voter registry without citizens having to show up. Moreover, data protection legal guarantees already exist. Financial sustainability should not be a problem since the functioning of the new system would be financed through the civil registry budget. Finally, political sustainability is ensured, given the reliability of the database as mentioned above.

## Sierra Leone

### *Background*

There are two electoral bodies in Sierra Leone. The Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) is in charge of the parties and candidates' registration, and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) oversees voter registration and polling operations. Since 2007, NEC has conducted a series of different elections: presidential and parliamentary elections (2007); local council elections (2008); and presidential, parliamentary and local council elections (2012).

### *Voter registration systems and methodologies*

Voter registration in 2007 was meant for that particular election. Optical machine reader (OMR) and scanning technology were used. A number of limitations were identified, among them the impossibility of tracking multiple registrations. After the 2008 elections, NEC opted for a continuous voter registration system supported by a new technology in its efforts to tackle shortfalls identified with the OMR technology.

Biometric voter registration (BVR) technology was then introduced for the 2012 electoral process, with the use of two main biometric features: facial capture (photograph) and fingerprints (use of the two thumb prints). The key difference between 2007 and 2012 was that Polaroid machines were used to capture photographs in 2007 and voter cards were printed and issued instantly, while in 2012 data collected in the field had to be processed at the central level and de-duplicated before voter cards could be issued.

### *Voter registration process in Sierra Leone in 2012*

As noted previously, a full range of different elections were conducted in 2012. As part of the overall process, 3,000 voter registration centres were established throughout the country; 800 BVR kits were purchased, all powered by generators; and 760 voter registration teams were deployed.

Because of the limited number of BVR kits, it was not possible to implement voter registration operations simultaneously throughout the country. Therefore, the registration process was implemented in four stages, with a duration of 14 days per stage. The entire operation lasted eight weeks in total and 2,692,635 voters were registered.

Provisional voter lists were printed and displayed to allow potential voters and any citizen to check the lists. In the meantime, a data matching process (de-duplication) was undertaken to track multiple registrations. Voter cards were printed alongside the exhibition of the provisional voter roll. Final voter lists, with photographs, were produced at the end of the process.

### *De-duplication (data matching) operation*

Because of lack of appropriate technology in the country, the de-duplication operation had to be outsourced (to Belgium). This raised political concerns in Sierra Leone with regard to the integrity, the confidentiality, the security and the protection of the voter data being ferried outside the country. An agreement was eventually reached with political parties, all of which were allowed to send representatives to the de-duplication locations to closely monitor the operation.

### *Challenges and problems encountered*

- A small amount of data was lost due to corrupt files. People who could prove they had previously and timely registered (by showing their registration slips) were given the opportunity to re-register.
- Occasional misplacement of registrants due to the use of wrong location codes.
- A 1 percent discrepancy noted between raw registration figures (2.7 million voters) and electronic data recorded in the database (2,676,000 voters). There were about 27,000 missing thumbprints against registrants in the database after the de-duplication operation.
- Delays in capturing facial photograph due to technical setup of the BVR software, especially at the early stages of the process.
- Some 90,000 uncollected voter cards (representing 0.3 percent of registered voters) remained at the district offices. However, the law allows voters to cast their ballots even without voter cards as long as they have their names in the voter roll at the polling station.
- The operation was costly. The BVR system cost US\$10 million (entirely funded by the donors through a UNDP-managed basket fund). An additional US\$15 million was required for operational costs (staffing, rental of transportation means, etc.), jointly funded by donors and the government.

Of note as well is that there was heavy dependence on international vendors for printing of voter registries and cards.

### *Achievements and sustainability*

- The operation was expensive but contributed to the credibility of the 2012 electoral process and the broad acceptance of the election results.
- A more reliable and accepted voter roll was produced.
- The system provides a starting point for a continuous voter registration system that can be updated, as opposed to starting afresh every couple of years.
- The system is a long-term national investment. There are expectations that the BVR system could be used in the forthcoming national registration project.





Concluding  
remarks and  
recommendations  
by the EMB  
delegations

## Concluding remarks and recommendations by the EMB delegations

### Sustainability of electoral administration

- It is important to enshrine the establishment of an EMB, as well as its main components, into the national constitution as a safeguard against government interference
- The political sustainability of the electoral administration refers to its capacity to achieve and maintain, over time, the trust of stakeholders (through fulfilling both its political and administrative roles).
- Sustained political credibility of EMBs is dependent on the choice of model and legal/regulatory framework in place in the country, according to its own circumstances. External factors (political will, choice of electoral system, political party structure and behaviours) as well as internal ones (an EMB's attitudes and behaviours, policies and procedures) certainly contribute to the political sustainability of the EMB.
- Early electoral cost assessment is technically feasible and necessary under any EMB model.
- Cost-effective measures can always be taken, depending on cost categories. In general, integrated strategic and operational planning can contribute significantly to cost reduction.
- Budgetary allocations should be based on the needs defined by an EMB, rather than an EMB adapting allocations unilaterally decided by the government alone.
- Electoral assistance should have a long-term perspective, taking into account the entire electoral cycle, as well as the democratization stage of the country.

## Sustainability in electoral processes

- Because they refer to the core issue of political representation, electoral systems are a major factor in achieving and maintaining the credibility of electoral institutions and practices. In order to ensure sustainability, the choice of electoral system should be strategic, harmonizing short- and long-term objectives and taking into account the importance of flexibility to adapt to changing political conditions.
- In order for the choice of an electoral system to be sustainable, it needs to be widely negotiated with all stakeholders and address their concerns. If all main concerns regarding representation are not properly addressed, sustainability of the system will be in jeopardy. Therefore, making effective the principle of inclusiveness is crucial in guaranteeing sustainability of the system.
- Working at building and maintaining robust public opinion as a central institution of democracy is necessary. The main responsibility for this undertaking falls upon political leaders, civil society groups, mass media and opinion makers, and academic stakeholders.
- Political parties have a direct influence on the sustainability of democratic and electoral processes and must ensure that they represent the electorate in an acceptable manner. Parties must try to ensure that the electorate feel properly represented by focusing on the common interest rather than on narrower party interests.
- It is recommended that political parties engage in internal democratic practices, and also behave in a transparent manner toward and with the broader citizenry.
- Special responsibility for enhancing the sustainability of democracy falls upon politicians themselves, political parties, civil society groups, opinion leaders, academia, trade union and professional leaders, the educational system and the business sector.
- Clear regulations on disclosure of campaign funding and expenditure are desirable and should be associated with the creation of an independent enforcement body with strong investigative and sanctioning power.

## Sustainability in electoral operations

- National governments' allocations to electoral budgets should be based on the needs of the electoral administration and, include operating costs, and increase over time.
- Addressing timelines and budget/costs are essential planning considerations. Operational and procurement aspects should be considered at project design, with the involvement of technical experts from the EMB and other implementing partners.
- A timely, comprehensive financial risk analysis, including a mitigation strategy, should be carried out in order to avoid facing unnecessary additional costs at a later stage.
- Decisions on whether to allow and how to implement out-of-country voting should be taken after careful consideration of legal, technical, political and sustainability factors, as well as after a fully consultative, transparent and inclusive process.
- Decisions on polling sequencing should be based, as much as is legally possible, on political, technical and cost-effectiveness considerations, as well as preparedness of the voters
- In order to ensure security and sustainability of the electoral process, EMBs and their state apparatuses should be adequately empowered and backed by the necessary constitutional, legal, security and operational (including financial and technological) framework.

## Voter registration

- Voter registration systems and methodologies should be cost-effective in their choice and flexible in their implementation in order to allow the optimal inclusion of potential eligible voters. At the same time, they should minimize the occurrence of multiple or fraudulent registration.
- No single voter registration methodology can be applied in all circumstances: what works in one country may not work in another one. Comprehensive feasibility studies, including the involvement of key stakeholders, need to be conducted prior to the introduction of a new methodology. Adequate time allocation, transparency and inclusion of stakeholders at all stages of the process are key to the political sustainability of the voter registry.
- If a methodology is adopted that involves high-tech equipment and software, it is important to build bridges between the electoral administration and other branches of the state administration where possible. Such equipment may be of use to other state organs, but at all stages protection of personal data should be of paramount concern.
- The identification of citizens is usually (but not always) the responsibility of state organs other than EMBs. Moreover, there are countries with population registries that are additional to civil registries (e.g., municipal residents' rolls, especially in continental Europe), which are often taken as the basis for the compilation of voter lists. It is recommended that states fulfil their responsibility for population censuses, civil registries and other forms of population registration so that EMBs can fulfil their voter registration mandate.
- New technologies cannot, by themselves, build trust in an electoral process, and should not be seen as a technical panacea to electoral problems that are fundamentally political in nature. When considering the introduction of new technologies, governments and EMBs should conduct rigorous feasibility studies to consider: i) whether technology can address the issues they are meant to address; and ii) where they can address these issues, whether they can be introduced in a sustainable manner.
- Identity card systems, like all population registration systems, can significantly improve the state's management of its resources by accurately documenting citizens and targeting services where most appropriate, including assisting in voter registration. Special care must be given, however, to ensuring that adequate legal frameworks for data protection are in place to ensure transparent use of data by the state, in a manner that does not infringe upon citizens' right to privacy.



European  
Commission

**Joint EC-  
Sustainability**





# Annex

## **-UNDP Thematic Workshop on Integrity in Electoral Administration:**

Adequate Resourcing for  
Credible Elections

Agenda of the  
workshop

Maputo, Mozambique, 4-8 March 2013

**Day 1**

Monday

4 March 2013

<b>8.00 – 8.30</b>	Registration of participants
<b>8.30 – 10.15</b>	<b>Opening session</b>
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Pierre Harzé</b> , Deputy Director, United Nations / United Nations Development Programme Representation Office in Brussels
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Opening remarks and key notes</b> <b>Dr. João Leopoldo da Costa</b> , President, Comissão Nacional de Eleições de Mozambique (CNE) <b>Mr. Paul Malin</b> , Ambassador, EU Delegation Mozambique <b>Ms. Jennifer Topping</b> , UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative, Mozambique <b>Ms. Geraldine J Fraser-Moleketi</b> , Practice Director, Democratic Governance Group, UNDP/BDP <b>Mrs. Carmelita Rita Namashulua</b> , Minister of State Administration, Ministry of State Administration, Mozambique
<b>10.15 – 10.30</b>	<b>Workshop aims: introduction to the agenda and housekeeping</b>
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Etienne Claeye</b> , Head of Democracy Sector - Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights Unit. European Commission - EuropeAid - Development and Cooperation DG <b>Niall McCann</b> , UNDP Senior Electoral Assistance Advisor and Coordinator EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance
<b>10.30 – 11.00</b>	Group picture
<b>11.00 – 11.30</b>	Coffee Break
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Bechir Bungu Munta</b> , Secrétaire Exécutif National Adjoint, CENI République Démocratique du Congo
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Mary Horvers</b> , Task Manager, EU Delegation Republic of Yemen
<b>11.30 – 12.00</b>	<b>Sustainability in EMB legal architecture</b>
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Francisco Cobos-Flores</b> , International Electoral Expert
<b>12.00 – 12.30</b>	<b>Political sustainability of electoral administration</b>
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Carlos Valenzuela</b> , UN Chief Technical Advisor for electoral support in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya
<b>12.30 – 13.00</b>	Questions and discussion
<b>13.00 – 14.00</b>	Lunch Break
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>William Davis</b> , Executive Secretary, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Isabel Otero-Blum</b> , Electoral advisor, UNDP Egypt
<b>14.00 – 14.30</b>	<b>Comparative data on costs of elections</b>
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Mathieu Bile</b> , Director, UN Electoral Division in the Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>14.30 – 15.00</b>	<b>Comparative cost of the three categories of EMBs</b>
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Rafael Lopez-Pintor</b> , International Electoral Expert
<b>15.00 – 15.30</b>	<b>Sustainability in EMB financing</b>
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Flavien Misoni</b> , Chief Technical Advisor, EU/UNDP electoral project in Burkina Faso
<b>15.30 – 16.00</b>	Questions and discussion
<b>16.00 – 16.30</b>	Coffee Break
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>João Damião</b> , Commissioner, CNE Angola
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Abdoul Wahab Ba</b> , Peace and Development Advisor, UNDP Togo
<b>16.30 – 17.30</b>	<b>A comparative discussion on EMB models</b>
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Manuel Carrillo</b> , Chief of Staff, International Affairs Unit, Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico <b>Narayan Gopal Malego</b> , Secretary of Election Commission of Nepal <b>João Lepoldo da Costa</b> , President of NEC, Mozambique
<b>17.30 – 18.00</b>	Questions and discussion
<b>18.00</b>	Welcome cocktail

<b>Day 2</b>		<b>Module 2</b>		
<b>Tuesday</b>		<b>Sustainability in electoral processes</b>		
<b>5 March 2013</b>				
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Barthélemy Kere</b> , <i>Président, CENI Burkina Faso</i>			
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Mourtada Deme</b> , <i>Project Director, UNDP Nigeria</i>			
<b>8.30 – 9.00</b>	<b>Presentation of the forthcoming Global Electoral Organisation (GEO) by the Korean delegation</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Kim Yong-Hi</b> , <i>Deputy Secretary-General, NEC Republic of Korea</i>			
<b>9.00 – 9.20</b>	<b>Impact of electoral systems and representation on sustainability</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Carlos Valenzuela</b> , <i>UN Chief Technical Advisor for electoral support in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya</i>			
<b>9.20 – 09.40</b>	<b>Public opinion: a necessary institution for sustainability?</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Rafael Lopez-Pintor</b> , <i>International Electoral Expert</i>			
<b>09.40 – 10.00</b>	<b>The role of political parties</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Raquel Rico-Bernabe</b> , <i>UNDP Electoral Assistance Specialist, EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>			
<b>10.00 – 10.30</b>	Questions and discussion			
<b>10.30 – 11.00</b>	Coffee Break			
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Mohammed Nuru Yakubu</b> , <i>National Commissioner, INEC Nigeria</i>			
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Simon Finley</b> , <i>Asia Pacific Electoral Advisor, UNDP Regional Center Bangkok</i>			
<b>11.00 – 11.20</b>	<b>The sustainability of electoral campaigns financing</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Gianpiero Catozzi</b> , <i>UNDP Electoral Assistance Advisor, EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>			
<b>11.20 – 11.40</b>	<b>Political financing and implications on electoral integrity</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Ricardo Godinho Gomes</b> , <i>Programme Manager, Pro-PALOP-TL project</i>			
<b>11.40 – 12.00</b>	<b>Distance between the electorate and its representatives: Is the democratic system sustainable?</b>			
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Deborah Ullmer</b> , <i>NDI Deputy Regional Director for Southern and Eastern Africa</i>			
<b>12.00 – 12.30</b>	Questions and discussion			
<b>12.30 – 14.00</b>	Lunch Break			
<b>14.00 – 15.30</b>	<b>Case Studies</b>			
	<b>Libya</b>	<b>Ivory Coast</b>	<b>Korea</b>	<b>Sao Tomé and Príncipe</b>
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Nuri AlAbbar</b> <i>Chairman, High National Election Commission, Libya</i>	<b>Antoine Adou</b> <i>Conseiller Spécial du Président de la CEI, Côte d'Ivoire</i>	<b>Kim Jeong-Gon</b> <i>Director General of International Electoral Affairs, NEC Republic of Korea</i>	<b>Elsa Monteverde</b> <i>Member of NEC, Sao Tome and Principe</i>
<b>Rapporteurs:</b>	<b>Baha Bakri</b> <i>Legal advisor, Support to the electoral process in Tunisia, UNDP Tunisia</i>	<b>María Sanchez Gil-Cepeda</b> <i>Programme Manager EU Delegation Lebanon</i>	<b>Silvain Schultze</b> <i>Programme Manager, EU Delegation Togo</i>	<b>Abdoulaye Kourouma</b> <i>Electoral Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP Mozambique</i>
<b>15.30 – 16.00</b>	Coffee Break			
<b>16.00 – 17.30</b>	<b>Plenary session: case studies reporting and discussion</b>			
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Gopal Krishna Siwakoti</b> , <i>PhD, Secretary General, National Election Observation Committee (NEOC)</i>			
<b>Rapporteurs:</b>	<b>Case studies rapporteurs</b>			

<b>Day 3</b>		<b>Module 3</b>			
<b>Wednesday</b>		<b>Sustainability in electoral operations</b>			
<b>6 March 2013</b>					
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Damian Lubuva</b> , <i>Commission Chairman, NEC United Republic of Tanzania</i>				
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Harouna Ouédraogo</b> , <i>Assistant Représentant Résident/Team Leader Gouvernance, UNDP Burkina Faso</i>				
<b>9.00 – 09.20</b>	<b>Sustainability in polling</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Denis Kadima</b> , <i>Executive Director, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)</i>				
<b>9.20 – 09.40</b>	<b>A comparative analysis of the costs of polling in advanced democracies, developing countries, elections in crisis areas, post conflict and transitional elections</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Vincent Tohbi</b> , <i>Director of Programs, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)</i>				
<b>09.40 – 10.00</b>	<b>How to diminish election procurement costs?</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Victor Margall</b> , <i>Procurement Specialist, UNDP Procurement support office Copenhagen (PSO)</i>				
<b>10.00 – 10.30</b>	Questions and discussion				
<b>10.30 – 11.00</b>	Coffee Break				
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Safaa Al-Musawi</b> , <i>Spokesperson, IHEC Iraq</i>				
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Francesca Pavarini</b> , <i>Programme Manager, EU Delegation Kenya</i>				
<b>11.00 – 11.20</b>	<b>Sustainability of out-of-country voting models</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Eamon O'Mordha</b> , <i>Team Leader Policy and Institutional Memory, UN Electoral Assistance Division</i>				
<b>11.20 – 11.40</b>	<b>Polling sequence: implications on sustainability</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Almami Cyllah</b> , <i>Africa Regional Director, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)</i>				
<b>11.40 – 12.00</b>	<b>Securing elections: sustainability implications</b>				
<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Akshay Rout</b> , <i>Director General, Election Commission of India</i>				
<b>12.00 – 12.30</b>	Questions and discussion				
<b>12.30 – 14.00</b>	Lunch Break				
<b>14.00 – 15.30</b>	<b>Case studies</b>				
	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Angola</b>	<b>Senegal</b>	
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Safaa Al-Musawi</b> <i>Spokesperson, IHEC Iraq</i>	<b>Terry Tselane</b> <i>Vice Chairperson, IEC South Africa</i>	<b>João Damião</b> <i>Commissioner, CNE Angola</i>	<b>Doudou Ndir</b> <i>Président, CENA Sénégal</i>	
<b>Rapporteurs:</b>	<b>Osama Matri</b> <i>Governance Specialist, UNDP Libya</i>	<b>Hamida Kibwana</b> <i>Project Manager, UNDP SADC-ECF</i>	<b>Victor Giner</b> <i>Programme Manager, EU Delegation Guinea-Bissau</i>	<b>Elwira Dolina</b> <i>Communications, EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>	
<b>15.00 – 15.30</b>	Coffee Break				
<b>15.30 – 17.00</b>	<b>Plenary session: case studies reporting and discussion</b>				
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Mamane Seydou</b> , <i>Directeur Général des Affaires Politiques et Judiciaires, Ministère de l'Intérieur Niger</i>				
<b>Rapporteurs:</b>	<b>Case studies rapporteurs</b>				

**Day 4**

Thursday

7 March 2013

**Module 4****Sustainability in voter registration**

<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Amadou Magagi</b> , <i>Secrétaire Général Permanent, CENI Niger</i>			
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Serena Bertaina</b> , <i>Programme Manager, EU Delegation Tanzania</i>			
<b>9.00 – 9.20</b>	<b>Voter registration: sustainability and cost implications of various methodologies</b> <b>Dieudonné Tshiyoyo</b> , <i>Regional Electoral Advisor, UNDP Regional Centre Dakar</i>			
<b>Speaker:</b>				
<b>9.20 – 09.40</b>	<b>Voter registration and the introduction of ICT: sustainability and cost implications</b> <b>Clement Aganahi</b> , <i>International electoral/ICT expert</i>			
<b>Speaker:</b>				
<b>9.40 – 10.00</b>	<b>Voter Registration methodologies and the political sustainability throughout the process</b> <b>Teresa Polara</b> , <i>Electoral Assistance Specialist, European Commission - EuropeAid - Development and Cooperation DG</i>			
<b>Speaker:</b>				
<b>10.00 – 10.30</b>	Questions and discussion			
<b>10.30 – 11.00</b>	Coffee Break			
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Khamees Salem</b> , <i>Commissioner, Supreme Committee for Elections and Referendum Yemen</i>			
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Lena Veierskov</b> , <i>Programme Manager, EU Delegation Democratic Republic of Congo</i>			
<b>11.00 – 11.30</b>	<b>Independently managed voter registers versus voter registers generated from national population and civil registration systems: cost and other sustainability implications</b> <b>Karine Sahli-Majira</b> , <i>International Demographer</i>			
<b>Speaker:</b>				
<b>11.30 – 12.00</b>	<b>Sustainability matters around data protection and the use of national ID cards</b> <b>Niall McCann</b> , <i>UNDP Senior Electoral Assistance Advisor and Coordinator EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>			
<b>Speaker:</b>				
<b>12.00 – 12.30</b>	Questions and discussion			
<b>12.30 – 14.00</b>	Lunch Break			
<b>14.00 – 15.30</b>	<b>Case Studies</b>			
<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>Tarek Saad</b> <i>Deputy Head of Policies and Programs Department, Ministry of State for Administrative Development Egypt</i>	<b>Afghanistan</b> <b>Ziaulhaq Amarkhil</b> <i>Chief Electoral Officer, IEC Afghanistan</i>	<b>Cape Verde</b> <b>Arlinda Chantre</b> <i>Director General, Directorate General in Support of Electoral Processes Cape Verde</i>	<b>Sierra Leone</b> <b>William Davis</b> <i>Executive Secretary, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone</i>
<b>Rapporteurs:</b>	<b>Amor Boubakri</b> <i>Legal Advisor, project in support to the electoral process, UNDP Tunisia</i>	<b>Senelisiwe Ntshangase</b> <i>Programme Analyst Governance, HIV &amp; AIDS, UNDP Swaziland</i>	<b>Sylvie Estriga</b> <i>Political analyst, EU Delegation Mozambique</i>	<b>Simon-Pierre Nanitelamio</b> <i>Chief Technical Advisor EU/UNDP electoral project in Madagascar</i>
<b>15.30 – 16.00</b>	Coffee Break			
<b>16.00 – 17.00</b>	<b>Plenary session: case studies reporting and discussion</b> <b>Moderator:</b> <b>Ali Mohamed Manik</b> , <i>Commissioner, Elections Commission Maldives</i> <b>Rapporteurs:</b> <b>Case studies rapporteurs</b>			

<b>Day 5</b>		<b>Module 5</b>	
<b>Friday</b>		<b>Sustainability of international assistance to electoral processes</b>	
<b>8 March 2013</b>			
<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Guy Jean Clément Mébiana</b> , <i>Direction des Affaires Electorales, DGAE - République du Congo</i>	<b>Rapporteur:</b>	<b>Pierre-Antoine Archange</b> , <i>Head of Democratic Governance Unit, UNDP Haiti</i>
<b>9.00 – 9.30</b>	<b>UN/DPA electoral assistance policy frameworks and UN electoral assistance evaluations</b>	<b>Speakers:</b>	<b>Eamon O'Mordha</b> , <i>Team Leader Policy and Institutional Memory, UN Electoral Assistance Division</i> <b>Niall McCann</b> , <i>UNDP Senior Electoral Assistance Advisor and Coordinator EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>
<b>9.30 – 9.45</b>	<b>EU electoral assistance policy framework</b>	<b>Speaker:</b>	<b>Teresa Polara</b> , <i>Electoral Assistance Specialist, European Commission - EuropeAid - Development and Cooperation DG</i>
<b>9.45 – 10.30</b>	<b>The future of international electoral assistance: Moderated panel discussion</b>	<b>Panel members:</b>	<b>Representatives of EU, EAD, UNDP, IFES, DFID, NDI and Aid Agencies</b>
		<b>Moderator:</b>	<b>Denis Kadima</b> , <i>Executive Director, EISA</i>
<b>10.30 – 11.00</b>	Questions and discussion		
<b>11.00 – 11.30</b>	Coffee Break		
<b>11.30 – 12.30</b>	<b>Plenary discussions: summary of issues and recommendations</b>	Facilitated by three EMB representatives	
<b>Moderators:</b>	<b>Teresa Polara</b> , <i>Electoral Assistance Specialist, European Commission - EuropeAid - Development and Cooperation DG</i>	<b>Gianpiero Catozzi</b> , <i>UNDP Electoral Assistance Advisor, EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance</i>	
<b>12.30 – 13.00</b>	<b>Closing of the Conference</b>	<b>Speakers:</b>	
		<b>Etienne Claeys</b> , <i>Head of Democracy Sector - Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights Unit - European Commission - EuropeAid - Development and Cooperation DG</i>	
		<b>Pierre Harzé</b> , <i>Deputy Director, United Nations / United Nations Development Programme, Representation Office in Brussels</i>	
<b>13.00 – 14.30</b>	Lunch		





**co-organised by**



European Commission  
United Nations Development Programme  
Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance



**GPECS**

Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support



**learn4dev**  
JOINT COMPETENCE DEVELOPMENT

**hosted by**



Government of the  
Republic  
of Mozambique